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6
7 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
8 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 In re

10 MORTGAGES LTD.,

11 Debtor.

Chapter 11

Case No. 2:08-bk-07465-RJH

**ML MANAGER'S (1) NOTICE OF LODGING
ALLOCATION MODEL TO BE USED WITH
REGARD TO THE DISBURSEMENT OF
PROCEEDS TO THE NEWMAN LOAN
INVESTORS, (2) NOTICE THAT
ALLOCATION MODEL HAS GENERAL
APPLICABILITY TO ALL INVESTORS, And
(3) MOTION TO APPROVE ALLOCATION
MODEL**

**Hearing Date: Sept. 21, 2010
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.**

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18 As has been discussed in many different contexts in this matter, the question of the
19 "Allocation Model" for the payment of costs and expenses is an important predicate issue
20 prior to making distributions Investors.¹ Although this issue has generally applicability to
21 all ML Loans and all Investors, it has initial application in the distribution of proceeds to
22 the Investors in ML Loan #7987S2 (the "Newman Loan"). The borrower under the
23 Newman Loan has paid off all amounts due. As demonstrated below, the Plan requires

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25 ¹ To the extent defined in the First Amended Plan of Reorganization as confirmed by the
26 Court, (*see* Docket Nos. 1532 (the, First Amended Plan), 1755 (Confirmation
Order)(collectively hereinafter, the "Plan"), defined terms herein shall have the same
meaning as set forth in the Plan.

1 that before disbursing money to the Newman Loan Investors,² or any other Investor ML
2 Manager must first assess them their proportionate share of all costs and expenses,
3 including the Exit Financing (collectively, “Costs”), in a fair, equitable and non-
4 discriminatory manner.

5 In determining a proportionate share of all Costs in a fair equitable and non-
6 discriminatory manner, there are many issues that arise. For example, the total amount of
7 Costs is not yet known and it is also not known for sure how many of the loans will
8 produce a recovery sufficient to cover their share of the Costs. There are many issues to
9 consider on what constitutes a “General Cost” that the Plan contemplates will be spread
10 across all Investors, and a loan “Specific Cost” that is to be allocated to particular loans.
11 ML Manager has spent literally hundreds of hours, employed accounting and legal
12 professionals, and considered everything from small details or implications to large macro
13 philosophies. ML Manager, by unanimous vote of the ML Manager Board, has now
14 adopted a model to estimate and allocate all the Costs associated with each of the ML
15 Loans (the “Allocation Model”) that it believes, in the exercise of its business judgment,
16 meets its obligations and is fair, equitable and non-discriminatory. Once the Allocation
17 Model has been approved, ML Manager can apply the Model to the Newman Loan
18 Investors. Until then, in order to provide for any contingencies that may arise during the
19 process of approving the Allocation Model, and pursuant to the Court Order to disburse
20 the undisputed amount, ML Manager has disbursed to most of the Newman Loan
21 Investors, approximately 80% of the amount received from the pay-off of the Newman
22 Loan. This should leave sufficient cushion for any adjustments that should be made in the
23 Allocation Model.

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25 ² The Investors in the Newman Loan are collectively, the “Newman Loan Investors.” The
26 Newman Loan Investors and the amounts of their respective investments in the loan is set
forth on Exhibit A.

1 **I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

2 On June 2, 2010, one of the investors in the Newman Loan filed a motion seeking
3 an order compelling the turnover of proceeds from the Newman Loan. (Docket 2771)
4 Following a hearing on June 30, 2010, the Court issued an Order requiring ML Manager
5 by September 1, 2010 to complete its analysis on how to allocate costs and expenses to
6 the Newman Loan Investors, distribute to the Newman Loan Investors their undisputed
7 share of the proceeds from the Newman Loan,³ and provide to the other Investors that
8 were in a similar situation notice of the methodology of the Allocation Model (*See* Docket
9 No. 2802) (the “Newman Loan Order). In the Newman Loan Order, the Court set a
10 briefing schedule and a hearing date to consider the issues surrounding the “accounting of
11 the charge back amount and the methodology as to how the amounts were determined.”
12 (*Id.*) ML Manager believes that the Allocation Model fulfills this obligation.

13 Pursuant to the Court’s instruction, ML Manager hereby provides notice of its
14 intent to make, as soon as the Allocation Model is approved by the Court, a net
15 distribution to the Newman Loan Investors as set forth in Exhibit A.⁴ This net distribution
16 was calculated through the Allocation Model by estimating, based on ML Manager’s
17 business judgment, the “Total Expected Costs” (as defined below) for the Newman Loan
18 Investors, as well as all other Investors.⁵

19 ³ Because the Allocation Model spreads the Costs based on certain assumptions, a final
20 decision on how much to distribute to the Newman Loan Investors necessarily requires an
21 approval of the methodology adopted in the Allocation Model. Accordingly, ML
22 Manager has distributed approximately 80% of the proceeds from the Newman Loan
23 (except as noted below) in order to leave sufficient cushion for any adjustments that are
24 required as a result of the consideration and approval of the Allocation Model.

25 ⁴ The net distribution made after the Court approves the Allocation Model will be the
26 difference between the amount set forth on Exhibit C (or some other amount if the Court
orders changes to the Allocation Model) and the approximate 80% of the proceeds that
have already been distributed.

⁵ As further events warrant, there may be some additional money that can be distributed to
all Investors, including the Newman Loan Investors. Primary among these issues would
be if the velocity of recovery is quicker than currently estimated, if costs are less than
currently estimated, and/or if more loans are able to cover their share of costs than
currently estimated. If that is the case, there additional distributions may be warranted.

1 Separate from the Allocation Model is the issue of whether ML Manager has
2 claims against an Investor. As explained below, the Agency Agreements that govern the
3 relationship with Newman Loan “Pass-Through” Investors and all other Pass-Through
4 Investors provide that the Investors are responsible and must indemnify ML Manager for
5 the costs and damages they have caused. As explained in more detail below, ML
6 Manager has a claim for offset or recoupment under these provisions against at least one
7 of the Newman Loan Investors, Rosenfield. Accordingly, ML Manager has caused the
8 escrow agent to hold in an interest bearing account, pending final resolution of the offset
9 and recoupment issues, the distributions to Rosenfield.

10 As discussed below, ML Manager believes that in general the Allocation Model
11 applies to all Investors. Accordingly, pursuant to the direction from the Court, ML
12 Manager further provides notice that it believes that this general Allocation Model applies
13 to all Investors and that it intends to proceed in the future by utilizing this Allocation
14 Model.⁶ Pursuant to the Newman Loan Order, any objections to the utilization or
15 implementation of the Allocation Model must be asserted by September 10, 2010, with a
16 hearing held on September 21, 2010. Finally, pursuant to the reservation of jurisdiction
17 under the Plan of Reorganization for this Court to resolve any disputed matters, ML
18 Manager hereby moves for an Order from the Court approving this Allocation Model.

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20 ⁶ The Mortgages Ltd. 401(k) Plan (the “401(k) Plan”) has recently filed a number of
21 pleadings and documents asserting that they are not liable for Costs, and has, among other
22 things, asked this Court to abstain from ruling on the issue until the forum for resolution
23 of this issue can be determined. ML Manager recognizes that the issue of whether the
24 401(k) Plan is liable for Costs has not yet been determined by any court. Accordingly,
25 ML Manager has an Allocation Model that includes the \$22 million in loans owned by the
26 401(k) Plan, and an Allocation Model that excludes the 401(k) Plan interest in those loans.
Several other Investors, such as the Rev-Op Group, have asserted that they also are not
liable for the Exit Financing. ML Manager believes that there are final judgments or
decisions by this Court on all of those issues, so no other version of the Allocation Model
has been created to eliminate other Investors. Indeed, exclusion of a substantial number
of Investors from the Allocation Model would materially affect it and potentially frustrate
the entire exercise. However, if further rulings or decisions were rendered by this Court
or an appellate court, the Allocation Model would need to be adjusted.

1 Inasmuch as ML Manager has provided notice that it believes that this Allocation Model
2 is an appropriate exercise of its business judgment, fulfills all of ML Manager's
3 obligations and duties related to this subject, and generally applies to all Investors, any
4 objections to this general Allocation Model should be asserted and resolved at this time,
5 and any unasserted objections to the Allocation should be barred in the future.

6 One key assumption in the Allocation Model is that all Investors (including the so-
7 called Non-Transferring Pass-Through Investors, the MP Fund Investors, the Rev-Op
8 Investors, the Loan LLC Investors, or the 401(k) Plan) are liable for their fair share of the
9 Costs and are subject to the Allocation Model. If any group is taken out then the Total
10 Cost Estimates numbers would necessarily increase for all remaining Investors.
11 Therefore, ML Manager has decided that as the Court considers the amount that can be
12 allocated to the Newman Loan Investors that the Court should have the complete picture.
13 There are a few other pending matters brought by the 401(k) Plan, Robert Furst, the Rev-
14 Op Group, some or all of the Oxford Partners Group and the Guillorys that might have an
15 impact on who is allocated their fair share of the Costs. The rulings on those matters and
16 any appeals from those matters could impact this Allocation Model. Accordingly, rather
17 than litigate those Allocation Model issues in a piecemeal fashion, ML Manager has
18 decided to provide this Notice and Motion to all Investors.

19 **II. BUSINESS JUDGMENT**

20 The business judgment test is the applicable standard to be applied to the
21 Allocation Model, and it is clear that ML Manager has satisfied this standard.

22 **A. The Applicable Test for Evaluation of the Allocation Model Is**
23 **The Business Judgment Test**

24 Both factually and legally, the test to be employed to determine the appropriateness
25 of the Allocation Model is the business judgment standard. The business judgment rule is
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1 that the officer and directors of a corporation⁷ are authorized to handle the ordinary
2 business affairs of the corporation according to their best judgment. *Tovrea Land and*
3 *Cattle Company v. Linsenmeyer*, 100 Ariz. 107, 129-30, 412 P.2d 47, 62 (1966)(quoting
4 *Fagerberg v. Phoenix Flour Mills Co.*, 50 Ariz. 227, 71 P.2d 1022 (1937). *See also*,
5 *Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdel*, 930 F. Supp. 417, 423-24 (D. Ariz. 1994)(“The
6 business judgment rule, stated generally, ‘precludes judicial inquiry into actions taken by
7 a director in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the legitimate and lawful
8 furtherance of a corporate purpose.’ *Shoen v. Shoen*, 167 Ariz. 58, 804 P.2d 787, 794
9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); see *Kadish v. Phx. Scotts. Sports Co.*, 11 Ariz. App. 575, 466 P.2d
10 794, 797 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). The rule thus applies if directors act in furtherance of a
11 legitimate corporate purpose, in good faith, and after reasonably informing themselves.
12 *See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Teets*, 155 Ariz. 123, 745 P.2d 181, 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
13 (citations omitted). *See also FDIC v. Jackson*, 133 F.3d 694, 699, fn.5 (9th Cir. 1998)(“It
14 is the general rule that officers and directors of a corporation are authorized to handle the
15 ordinary business affairs of the corporation according to their best judgments...”)(quoting
16 *Fagerberg v. Phoenix Flour Mills Co.*, supra.)

17 The Plan, the evidence presented at the confirmation hearings, and the Court’s
18 prior Orders also establish that the standard that ML Manager must meet and was
19 contemplated that ML Manager would meet in order to faithfully discharge its obligations
20 to the Investors and under the law in determining issues surrounding an Allocation Model
21 for the payment of costs and expenses and distribution of money to the Investors is the
22 business judgment test. For example, during the evidentiary hearing on the confirmation
23 of the Plan, Ed McDonough testified that ML Manager’s decisions would be based on

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25 ⁷ To analyze the duties in a limited liability company, Arizona looks to authorities on
26 corporations. *See Nutek Info. Sys., Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n*, 194 Ariz. 104, 106, 977
P.2d 826, 828 (App. 1998)(noting characteristics of a limited liability company that are
equivalent to those in other types of organizations).

1 their business judgment. *See e.g.*, May 18, 2009 Transcript (Docket 2136), at p. 92-93.
2 The Plan provides that ML Manager shall be formed pursuant to an operating agreement
3 substantially in the form attached to the Disclosure Statement as Exhibit M. With regards
4 to disbursements, Exhibit M to the Disclosure Statement provides that “Cash Available
5 for Distribution, if any, shall be available for distribution to the Members, at such times as
6 the Manager [the ML Manager Board] may determine in its sole discretion.” (Exhibit M
7 to Disclosure Statement, at § 3.1(a)). *See also id.*, at §§ 5.2(a), 5.3. The Court’s
8 Confirmation Order (Docket 1755) provides:

9 G. ...The Board of Manager [ML Manager’s
10 Board], through any manager authority by the Board [**ML**
11 **Manager**] **are authorized to execute any document**
necessary to effectuate and implement this Order, the
Plan and this paragraph.

12 H. The proposed Exit Financing is approved and
13 the Liquidating Trust, the **ML Manager LLC**, the MP Funds,
14 and the various Loan LLCs **are authorized to enter into**
Exit Financing and take all actions necessary to effectuate
such Exit Financing, including but not limited to,
15 **executing the necessary loan documents to implement Exit**
Financing, entering into an interborrower agreement, and
16 pledging their assets. ...

17 I. The Plan Proponents, Liquidating Trustee, **ML**
Manager LLC, Reorganized Debtor and Debtor **are**
18 **authorized, empowered and directed,** without further order
19 of the Court, to execute and deliver any instrument, security
20 agreement, deed of trust, or other document and **to perform**
any act that may be necessary, desirable or required for
the consummation of the Plan (emphasis added).

21 By authorizing ML Manager to take any action necessary or desirable to effectuate the
22 Plan, the Court essentially authorized ML Manager to exercise its business judgment.

23 In its Memorandum Decision (Docket, 2323) issued on October 21, 2009 in
24 connection with the Rev-Op Group’s Motion for Clarification, the Court found as follows:

25 Paragraph U of the confirmation order **permits the ML**
Manager to charge back to the non-opt-in participating
investors their proportionate share of all of its expenses,
26 including but not limited to the Exit Financing. This Plan

1 does impose a limitation that such charge back be fair,
2 equitable and proportional, but within those limitations **the**
3 **ML Manager can exercise his business judgment whether**
4 **to obtain financing to cover exit costs and operational**
5 **expenses, and when to make the charge backs.** (emphasis
6 added).

7 In its Order Approving the Grace Settlements (Docket 2825), issued on July 12,
8 2010, the Court found as follows:

9 (e) The Settlements and ML Manager’s decision to enter into
10 the Settlements reflect a reasonable compromise of the
11 complex issues involved, are in the best interests of the
12 investors in the Grace Entities Loans, **are supported by the**
13 **best exercise of business judgment of ML Manager and**
14 **are consistent with ML Manager’s fiduciary duties and**
15 **responsibilities.** (emphasis added).

16 The Court found in issuing its Final Declaratory Judgment on July 27, 2010 in
17 Adversary 2:10-ap-00430-RJH (the “Hawkins Adversary”) (Docket 105) that:

18 85. With regard to the issues raised by the Rev-Op Group in
19 their Declaratory Judgment Action, the Court finds **that ML**
20 **Manager has the authority, subject to provisions of the**
21 **Plan and Confirmation Order and a possible review by**
22 **the Court under a business judgment standard,** to (i) sell
23 or liquidate any investor’s interest, which includes the Rev-
24 Op Group’s respective interest, in the ML Loans if the
25 investor owns less than 100% interest in any Loan, (ii) initiate
26 and complete a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure or
trustee’s sale of property secured by the ML Loans, (iii)
settle, compromise or modify the terms of the ML Loans or
guarantees associated with the ML Loans pursuant to the
terms of the Agency Agreement and the Plan, (iv) initiate and
complete a sale of real property in which the Rev-Op Group
has an interest provided that more than one investor has an
interest in such property, and (v) **incur and seek to recover**
from the Rev-Op Group in a proportionate, non-
discriminatory, fair and equitable manner any costs and
expenses associated with the management of the ML
Loans including, if necessary in ML Manager’s
reasonable discretion, additional indebtedness. (emphasis
added).

Based on the applicable legal principals, the prior Court Orders, and the provisions
of the Plan and Confirmation Order, the applicable test to determine the appropriateness
of the Allocation Model is the business judgment standard. In other words, the applicable

1 test is whether the decision to adopt the Allocation Model was taken in good faith,
2 whether it is a legitimate and lawful exercise of ML Manager’s authority, whether ML
3 Manager informed itself of the issues, and whether it exercised business judgment.

4 **B. The Business Judgment Test Has Been Satisfied.**

5 There can be no serious debate as to whether the business judgment test has been
6 satisfied in this case. The Plan contemplates that a large portion of the Exit Financing and
7 general costs would be paid by the Liquidating Trust. However, at the present time, the
8 Liquidating Trust has yet to recover any significant amounts from claims against third
9 parties. ML Manager is hopeful that over time the Liquidating Trust will successfully
10 recover amounts from third parties and will be able to pay some or all of the Costs and
11 that will allow additional money to be returned to the Investors. Nevertheless, ML
12 Manager cannot assume at this time that any amount of the Exit Financing will be paid by
13 the Liquidating Trust. ML Manager, the ML Servicing staff, and ML Manager’s
14 professionals and advisors have spent literally hundreds of hours analyzing and
15 considering numerous issues in a very complex situation. ML Manager began working on
16 the issues related to “charge-backs” and allocating costs and expenses more than a year
17 ago. There were many viewpoints to consider and these competing viewpoints were often
18 disparate. ML Manager has taken great care to consider as many issues as possible in
19 arriving at this Allocation Model. In so doing, the ML Manager Board has been able to
20 finally arrive at a consensus approach and after hours of deliberation at Board meetings
21 and it has **unanimously** adopted the Allocation Model.

22 As noted above, there have been literally hundreds of hours devoted to this subject.
23 The ML Manager Board considered the issues for over a year. There were many, many
24 Board meetings devoted to the issues. A separate sub-committee of the Board was formed
25 to analyze the issues. ML Servicing staff was extensively involved and spent hundreds of
26 hours. Previous reports and prior analysis of the experts and professionals hired were

1 reviewed. Additional, experts and professionals were retained who were completely
2 independent of the prior experts and professionals retained by the Official Investors
3 Committee, including Simon Consulting, LLC -- Peter Davis, CPA/ABV, CIRA, CFE.
4 Almost all of the various legal counsel employed by ML Manager were also consulted in
5 connection with some or all of the issues involved.

6 All of the operative documents were reviewed and considered including the Plan,
7 the Disclosure Statement, the Confirmation Order, and the governing documents for the
8 Loan LLCs, ML Manager and other entities. The Exit Loan documents were also
9 reviewed, including the loan agreements and the interborrower agreement referred to in,
10 among other places, paragraph H of the Confirmation Order described above (the “Inter-
11 Borrower Agreement”). Already incurred costs, projected budgets and all projections or
12 estimations were reviewed and analyzed. Substantial information regarding the value of
13 the assets including all previously created appraisals, valuations, and new Broker’s
14 Opinions of Value and marketing information were reviewed. Finally, lengthy Board
15 meetings were held where the analysis, assumptions, projections, treatment and other
16 information was considered, reviewed and discussed at length. In short, there were and
17 are many moving pieces that have been evaluated, considered and implemented.

18 Moreover, ML Manager has had to make these decisions at a time when the
19 country and the local real estate and lending markets have undergone possibly the greatest
20 financial upheaval since the end of World War II. The list of unknowns and uncertainties
21 is great and includes, without limitation, the following:

22 A. Asset values have fallen significantly and may fall
23 further and no one knows when or if there will be a recovery
in the price of the assets during the Disposition Period.

24 B. The length of Disposition Period is unknown since the
25 velocity at which the assets can be sold depends on a number
26 of factors which the ML Manager cannot control, including
the interference or distraction caused by certain Investor
objections to almost every action taken by ML Manager.

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C. The current value of the real estate underlying the Loans cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy in the absence of actual offers from reputable buyers. Appraisals are expensive and not very helpful because they rely on past data and the market has continued to move. In addition, the ML Manager does not believe that it is an efficient utilization of resources to pay for appraisals of all of the assets at this time. ML Manager has spent considerable time evaluating and analyzing the properties, has obtained broker's opinions of value on many of the properties, and undertaken all actions that it deems prudent to evaluate the current value. Nevertheless, given the instability of the market, a determination of current value for all of the properties is extremely difficult.

D. There are unknown factors that limit or inhibit ML Manager's ability to manage the Loans and the Trust Property. For example, even after sale agreements have been approved by the Court and Loan LLCs, several have not closed due to the buyers backing out. When negotiating a sale contract, it is not known at the time whether the members of the Loan LLCs will vote to permit a particular sale. The complications in the sale process makes some buyers less interested. There have been issues raised with regard to loan documents and legal descriptions. City, County and other governmental regulations may pose an issue. Third parties have asserted claims such as mechanic lien claims and vendee liens. If sales are not approved, then the Disposition Period will be extended and there is a real possibility that the ML Manager may be unable to meet the required reductions in the maximum outstanding balance and the Exit Financing Lender may require sales of assets as permitted by the Exit Financing Documents which may result in lesser recoveries than the normal sale process.

E. The amount of litigation that the ML Manager on behalf of Investors may become involved in, and the number of bankruptcies of Borrower and Guarantors which may occur, and the costs thereof, cannot adequately be forecasted. As an example, the amount of professional fees claimed in the Bankruptcy far exceeded the reasonable estimates based on best information available at the time that was presented to the Court in the Plan confirmation process. In addition, until the claims by a small number of the Rev Ops and others claiming that they are not subject to the Agency Agreements and should not be required to pay for the Exit Financing are finally decided there will be some uncertainties, so it is not possible to determine the actual pool of assets from which the recovery will ultimately be paid.

F. Since the length of the Disposition Period cannot be

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determined for the reasons set forth above, the ML Manager will be unable to accurately forecast the total amount of Costs that will be incurred. Each year of delay in disposing of the assets raises the Costs substantially.

Given all of the foregoing unknowns and uncertainties, the only thing that the ML Manager Board can do is to exercise its business judgment to estimate all of the various variables that go into determining all of the required items necessary to make an initial and subsequent estimates of the costs, the possible recoveries in total and by each of the ML Loans, and to re-evaluate the estimations from time to time as more definitive data becomes available.

ML Manager recognizes that reasonable men could differ on various factors and forecasts that go into making such estimations, however, ML Manager does not believe that that is the test. In terms of withholding from distributions to Investors whose assets has been sold, the Board recognizes that money distributed to Investors cannot, as a practical matter, be recovered if it turns out that the estimated Costs are too low. Therefore the duty to Investors whose assets will be sold later requires that the Board be conservative and establish sufficient amounts to provide a reasonable margin of safety. The estimations are a matter of business judgment and the more unknowns and uncertainties exist, the greater the margin of safety that must be adopted. This decision is necessary to protect all Investors.

In short, ML Manager has taken extremely seriously its obligations and expended considerable time, effort, and resources to determine the proportional amount of the costs and expenses to allocate to all Investors in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory manner. Whether someone else would have come up with a different method is not the issue. The only issue is whether ML Manager exercised its business judgment in adopting the Allocation Model, and the answer to this question is clearly, Yes.

1 **III. THE ALLOCATION MODEL**

2 Based on the operative provisions of the Plan, the agreements that have been
3 entered into, such as the Inter-Borrower Agreement, and ML Manager’s determination of
4 what is necessary to constitute “fair, equitable and non-discriminatory treatment,” ML
5 Manager determined that there are three necessary prerequisites for the Allocation Model.

6 **A. The Goals of the Allocation Model**

7 First, the Allocation Model must apply to all or as many Investors, participants or
8 owners of the loans that were at issue in the Mortgages Ltd. bankruptcy as possible.
9 Exclusion of any group or groups simply shifts and increases the costs on remaining
10 Investors. The total amount of the ML Loans accounted for in the Allocation Model is the
11 total amount of the portfolio.⁸ This includes all owners of the loans that were subject to,
12 embroiled with, entangled with or otherwise impacted by the Mortgages Ltd. bankruptcy
13 proceedings. All owners of these loans were affected or benefited by the resolution of the
14 bankruptcy, the termination of the accrual of administrative expenses, and the
15 confirmation of the Plan. As such, it is ML Manager’s position that all owners of the ML
16 Loans must pay their fair share of the Costs in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory
17 manner. At the same time, the Allocation Model provides that once the Total Estimated
18 Costs are paid for any particular Loan, the Investors in that Loan are no longer responsible
19 for any additional accruing interest to either the Exit Lender, or, as defined below, the
20 Replacement Loan Lender or the Permitted Reserve Loan Lender. In other words, once
21 the Total Estimated Costs are paid, the Investors who have paid those costs have paid their
22 fair share and are not responsible for further interest. They may be entitled to receive
23 interest as described below, but they will not be required to pay additional interest.

24 The next principle is that all payments of the costs will be made from

25 ⁸ As noted above, because of the fact that there has been no resolution of the issue of
26 whether the 401(k) Plan is included or not, ML Manager has run the Allocation Model
with the 401(k) Plan interest in loans included, and its interest excluded.

1 disbursements. One of the features of the Plan as it was presented to the Investors for a
2 vote, presented to the Court during the confirmation hearings, and included in the
3 provisions of the Plan, was that there would be no mandatory capital calls. *See e.g.*, May
4 18, 2009 Transcript (Docket 2136), at p. 103. Repayment solely from disbursements was
5 expressly set forth in both the proposed and final versions of the Operating Agreements
6 for the Loans LLCs.⁹ (*See* Exhibit K to the Approved Disclosure Statement, at ¶ 2.3) In
7 other words, the Plan recognized that the Investors have already suffered significant
8 losses, and that no Investor should be required to write an additional check. Although
9 most of the loans are secured by a first position in real property that has value (albeit
10 sometimes substantially less than the amount of the loan), the collateral for some of the
11 loans may have no value at all, or insufficient value to pay the full share of Costs. This is
12 particularly true for loans in a second or third position. So the Allocation Model must
13 recognize and provide for what is called “Uncovered Costs.”

14 Finally, the proportionate share of the Costs, or “Cost Sharing Ratio” should be
15 based on the ratio of the principal balance of a loan as of the date of bankruptcy to the
16 entire portfolio balance. There are many reasons for this. For example, it leaves the risk
17 of the performance with the individual loans, which is important because some investors
18 specifically investigated and identified their loans. Moreover, final recoveries will not be
19 known until the conclusion of the disposition of all of the loans, the deficiency lawsuits,
20 and resolution of the Investor Damage claims in the Liquidating Trust. Obviously,
21 disbursements should not be held for years waiting final disposition of those issues.
22 Furthermore, the Inter-Borrower Agreement between the Loan LLCs requires this method

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24 ⁹ This is not to assert that Investors in any particular Loan could not agree to pay the Total
25 Estimated Costs and use their own funds for this purpose. Depending on the individual
26 circumstances, ML Manager is generally willing to negotiate an agreement to terminate
the Agency Agreement for any particular Loan upon the payment of the Total Estimated
Costs for that Loan. As a practical matter, the effect of such an agreement would be to
terminate responsibility for accruing interest.

1 of sharing of costs between the Loan LLCs. Because the Confirmed Plan requires that
2 Pass-Through Investors be treated in the same fashion as Loan LLC Investors, and the
3 Inter-Borrower Agreement requires the Loan LLCs to allocate Costs in this fashion, this
4 methodology is necessarily required.

5 In short, the fundamental premise or foundation for the Allocation Model is that all
6 or as many as possible of the Investors or owners of the ML Loans that were entangled in
7 the Mortgages Ltd. bankruptcy should pay their fair share of costs and expenses from
8 distributions received from the loans or from the disposition of those loans. There are no
9 free rides. Costs are paid from disbursements of proceeds received from the Loans so that
10 no Investor is required to write an additional check, and the proportionate basis for the
11 Cost Sharing Ratio is the initial principal balance of a particular loan to the entire
12 portfolio on the date of bankruptcy as then adjusted to allocate Uncovered Costs. For the
13 Loans where it is currently assumed that there will be a sufficient recovery to cover their
14 full share, the Allocation Model is that the share of General Costs is slightly more than
15 3% of the principal balance of the Loans. The Specific Costs depend on the costs
16 associated with each individual Loan.

17 **B. The Reason and Textual Support For The Allocation Model**

18 ML Manager is required to allocate the costs and expenses (“Costs”) incurred in
19 connection with serving and collecting the ML Loans and properties which it oversees
20 both in its capacity as a manager of the Loan LLCs which have an interest in such Loans
21 and as agent for the Pass-Through Investors and others (collectively, the “Pass-Through
22 Investors”) who did not transfer their participating interest in the Loans to a Loan LLC.

23 Section 4.13 of the Plan, as modified by paragraph U(3) of the Confirmation Order
24 provides as follows:

25 Each Loan LLC will distribute funds to its members pro rata
26 based upon their respective membership percentages in such
Loan LLC as set forth in the operating agreement for each of

1 the Loan LLCs. Any Pass-Through Investor that does not
2 transfer its fractional interest into a Loan LLC will receive its
3 distribution pursuant to the existing Agency Agreement and
4 other contracts which may be assigned to the ML Manager
5 LLC. Before such distributions are made, Pass-Through
6 Investors who retain their fractional interests in the ML Loans
7 shall be assessed their proportionate share of costs and
8 expenses of serving and collecting the ML Loans in a fair,
9 equitable and nondiscriminatory manner and shall be
10 reimbursed in the same manner as the other Investors.
11 (emphasis added).

12 The Operating Agreements for the Loan LLCs (and the Operating Agreements for the MP
13 Funds, as amended) all provide for distributions to their members after payment of all the
14 applicable costs and expenses. Moreover, the Inter-Borrower Agreement (as discussed
15 below) between, among others, ML Manager and the Loan LLCs, provides specific
16 reserves, expenses, and payments that must be made before distributions.

17 In its October 21, 2009 Memorandum Decision, the Court stated:

18 “Paragraph U of the Confirmation Order permits the ML
19 Manager to charge back to the non-opt-in participating
20 investors [i.e., the current Pass-Through Investors] their
21 proportionate share of all of its expenses, including but not
22 limited to the exist financing. This Plan does impose a
23 limitation that such charge back be fair, equitable and
24 proportional, but with those limitation the ML Manager can
25 exercise [its] business judgment whether to obtain financing
26 to cover exit costs and operations expenses, and when to
make the charge backs.”

In other words, the Pass-Through Investors are to be treated the same as the Investors in
the Loan LLCs. They are to be treated no better, or worse than the members of the Loan
LLCs.

Thus the Plan, as interpreted by the Court, provides that before making any
distributions, ML Manager has a duty to assess to all Investors, that includes all investors
who are in the Loan LLCs, and all Pass-Through Investors who did not transfer their
interests into a Loan LLC,¹⁰ their share of all costs and expenses, including those costs

¹⁰ Although ML Manager believes this includes the 401(k) Plan, ML Manager does not
intend to take any position that is in violation of ERISA law or otherwise legally

1 and expenses associated with the Exit Financing and costs incurred in managing the
2 Loans. The Costs must include the amounts paid or required to be paid under the Plan,
3 including professional fees approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Exit Financing costs, the
4 on-going costs of serving and collecting the Loans, operating costs of ML Manager,
5 litigation costs with various parties involved in the Loan matters and costs, including
6 specific costs, for a particular Loan, which are already allocated to the Loan LLCs under
7 the Inter-Borrower Agreement between the ML Manager, the Loan LLCs and the
8 Liquidating Trustee which was approved under the Plan and the other Investors under the
9 Plan and orders of the Bankruptcy Court. The intent and objective is to allocate the Costs
10 in a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory manner so that no Investor gets a “free ride”
11 and each Investor pays his or her fair share, but nothing more.

12 The Inter-Borrower Agreement is one of the foundations for the Allocation Model.
13 The Inter-Borrower Agreement was discussed in the Plan. Moreover, the basic terms of
14 the Inter-Borrower Agreement were presented to the Court through testimony of witnesses
15 during the confirmation hearing on May 18, 2009, and a copy of a draft inter-borrower
16 agreement, that is materially similar to the final version, was distributed to various parties
17 during the confirmation process and during discovery and depositions during this process.
18 Finally, as noted above, paragraph H to Confirmation Order expressly authorized the
19 execution of a inter-borrower agreement.

20 **C. The Basic Elements of the Allocation Model**

21 The Inter-Borrower Agreement provides for the various methods of allocation
22 between the Liquidating Trust and the Investors and allocation among the Investors and
23 must be consulted with respect to specific allocation issues. To implement the allocations
24 as contemplated by the Inter-Borrower Agreement, it is imperative that once the Costs

25 _____
26 improper. As such, if a determination is made that the 401(k) Plan is not subject to some
or all of the Costs, ML Manager will re-work the Allocation Model accordingly.

1 have been allocated among the Investors that sufficient moneys be withheld from any
2 distributions to Investors to assure that there will be sufficient funds at what is defined in
3 the Inter-Borrower Agreement as the “Final Settlement” date. The Final Settlement is the
4 date when under the Inter-Borrower Agreement all Costs which have been incurred are
5 paid and there has been a “practical realization” of the assets of the ML Loans and the
6 assets of the Liquidating Trust. In other words, the Final Settlement is when there has
7 been a final disposition of most or all of the ML Loans and the Liquidating Trust assets.

8 The Costs include the amounts paid or required to be paid under the Plan, including
9 professional fees approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Exit Financing costs, the on-going
10 costs of servicing and collecting the Loans, operating costs of ML Manager, litigation
11 costs with various parties involved in the Loan matters and costs, including specific costs
12 for a particular Loan, which are allocated to the Loan LLCs under the Inter-Borrower
13 Agreement between the ML Manager, the Loan LLCs and the Liquidating Trustee which
14 was approved under the Plan and the other Investors under the Plan and orders of the
15 Bankruptcy Court.

16 A basic premise of the Allocation Model is that all Investors in loans where there is
17 an adequate recovery pay the same proportionate share of the Costs, which necessarily
18 includes a reasonable estimate to cover potential future expenses. This is described in the
19 Allocation Model as the “Total Estimated Costs.” However, if the Total Estimated Costs
20 are less than estimated, which is the hope because the assumptions in the Model were all
21 intended to be very conservative, there may be additional distributions possible at or
22 before the Final Settlement or during a “True-Up” process.

23 As the Court will recall from the evidence presented during the Plan confirmation
24 hearings and in briefing and argument last fall in connection with the Motion for
25 Clarification filed by the Rev-Op Group, there is an issue of whether Pass-Through
26 Investors in loans that resolve early will be required to hold more money in reserve than

1 their Total Expected Costs, and if so, whether they would receive payments and interest
2 from proceeds from loans that resolve later. Because the Allocation Model adopted by
3 ML Manager is not requiring or contemplating that the Pass-Through Investors be
4 assessed more than their share of the Total Expected Costs, the answer to this question is,
5 No.

6 The Plan contemplates that the Exit Financing will be repaid as quickly as possible.
7 Indeed, 70% of all money received by the Loan LLCs must be paid by the Loan LLCs to
8 the Exit Financier (after a reserve is taken off the top for operating costs for ML Manager
9 of up to 10% or a total of \$5 million).¹¹ This means that more money will be paid to the
10 Exit Financier from loans that are resolved earlier than loans that are paid later. To adjust
11 for this, money from loans that are resolved later will be paid back to the Loan LLCs who
12 paid the Exit Financing, plus interest. The interest paid to the Loan LLCs who paid off
13 the Exit Financing is known as “Replacement Loan Interest.” The Allocation Model that
14 ML Manager has adopted provides both the Loan LLC members and Pass-Through
15 Investors will be assessed their share of the Total Estimated Costs, but for the Loan LLCs,
16 when an amount in excess of the Total Estimated Costs is taken under the 70% payment to
17 the Exit Financier, that amount in excess of the Total Expected Costs is a “Replacement
18 Loan” to be repaid with the “Replacement Loan Interest.” Because the Pass-Through
19 Investors are not initially assessed any more than their share of the Total Estimated Costs,
20 they do not receive any Replacement Loan Interest. In other words, the Pass-Through
21 Investors will receive money earlier than their counterparts in the Loan LLCs, but they
22 will not receive the Replacement Loan Interest, which is at the same interest rates as is in
23 the Exit Financing or 17.5%. As noted above, once the Total Estimated Costs are paid on
24 a particular loan, the Investors in that Loan are no longer responsible for either the Exit

25 _____
26 ¹¹ The Pass-Through Investors also are not required contribute to the 10% reserve, nor do
they receive any of the additional interest or Replacement Loan Interest on the reserve.

1 Loan Interest or the Replacement Loan Interest. They will have paid their fair share.

2 **D. Detailed Allocation Steps**

3 Key elements in the process include making an estimation of the: (i) total Costs
4 which will be incurred, (ii) total recovery¹² from the sales of Loans and foreclosed assets
5 and (iii) length of time which will be required to liquidate the assets (“Disposition
6 Period”) and arrive at a Final Settlement. To be conservative, where the total recovery of
7 from the sale of a Loan and foreclosed assets is unknown, ML Manager has adjusted its
8 estimated recovery amount in the Allocation Model by decreasing them 20% from current
9 estimates if the assets have not yet sold. For the same reason, ML Manager has also
10 increased in the Allocation Model its estimated operating costs going forward by 15%
11 over their current best projections. This makes the Model extremely conservative and
12 hopefully the final recovery will be substantially more than what is reflected in the Model.

13 With these principles, adjustments, and underlying premises, ML Manager has
14 adopted the following allocation steps in its business judgment and as required by the
15 Inter-Borrower Agreement for determining the “Sharing Ratio” among Investors for
16 sharing Costs, for estimating the potential recovery from the sale of assets and estimating
17 the Costs, and various re-allocations resulting from the inability of some Investors or the
18 Liquidating Trustee to pay some or all of their allocated share of the Costs (the

19 _____
20 ¹² ML Manager and its professionals and consultants have spent considerable time in
21 estimating the total potential recovery from sales of Loans and foreclosed assets.
22 Significantly, however, this information is extremely confidential and proprietary. For
23 example, ML Manager is in the process of negotiating sale prices with potential buyers of
24 many parcels, and pursuing and negotiating deficiencies from borrowers and guarantors.
25 It would be extremely damaging to these negotiations and processes to disclose the
26 estimated recovery or any information about expected revenues. Nevertheless, it was
essential to this Allocation Model to make such estimations. To eliminate the prejudice
that would occur to ML Manager and ultimately the Investors from a disclosure of these
recovery estimates, ML Manager has not included these numbers in this filing. ML
Manager is prepared to disclose these estimates to the Court for an *in camera* inspection
and to any investor who agrees to a Court ordered confidentiality agreement to prohibit
the use or further disclosure of these numbers. Simultaneously with this filing, ML
Manager is filing a Motion to set up a procedure to deal with this issue.

1 “Uncovered Costs”) to get to the Total Estimated Costs for each Loan. The following is an
2 outline of the general steps taken to determine the allocations.¹³

3 1. Determine Outstanding Loan Balances

4 Determine the outstanding principal balances for all Loans (each a “Loan” and
5 collectively the “Loans”) for which ML Manager is the Agent or which were held by an
6 Investor the date that Mortgages Ltd. filed bankruptcy. The ratio of each Loan’s
7 outstanding principal balance to the total principal balance outstanding is the initial
8 “Sharing Ratio” and the individual Sharing Ratio for each of the Investors in a loan is
9 their percentage interest in the particular Loan.

10 2. Loan Recovery Analysis

11 Review each Loan and assign an estimated gross sale amount (“Recovery”) to the
12 Property securing the Loan or an REO Property and then deduct the estimated Selling
13 Costs and Property Liens.¹⁴ Then, determine by Property the projected pool of revenue
14 available to make payment of Costs after the 20% adjustment if actual amounts are
15 unknown (the “Adjusted Net Proceeds”). The analysis includes an estimate of the likely
16 sales price of the property securing the Loans or the REO Property based upon the
17 available information, including broker’s opinions, as well as the potential Recovery from
18 guarantors. The estimate needs to be very conservative since it is better to withhold too
19 much money than too little money since the ML Manager is required to withhold
20 sufficient funds from distributions to Investors to assure, to the extent possible based upon
21 current available information, that sufficient funds are available on or before the Final
22 Settlement date to pay all Costs. In determining the Adjusted Net Proceeds, until the
23 factual data proves otherwise to a reasonable certainty, the Allocation Model assumes that

24 ¹³ Attached as Exhibit B is a summary of the detailed allocation steps.

25 ¹⁴ As noted above, the estimated Recovery and all estimates that would allow the
26 determination of the estimated Recovery are only being disclosed for *in camera* inspection
or subject to a Protective Order. This is because such information is confidential and
would harm ML Manager’s attempts to maximize the return from each of the ML Loans.

1 the Liquidating Trustee will have no Recoveries from the Non-Loan Assets and assumes
2 that there will be no Loan LLC Recoveries on Loan LLC Causes of Action. The Adjusted
3 Net Proceeds analysis will be revised if and to the extent of any actual such Recoveries.

4 3. Recalculate the Sharing Ratio

5 Once the Loan recovery analysis is done, the Sharing Ratio for each of the Loans
6 where a positive Recovery is expected (“Positive Recovery”) must be recalculated
7 (“Revised Sharing Ratio”) using in the denominator only the outstanding principal
8 balances of the Loans where a Positive Recovery is expected. To the extent that the
9 Revised Sharing Ratio causes one or more Loans to have a Recovery which is negative
10 (“Negative Recovery”) after deducting the allocation of Costs to a Loan, the same process
11 must be undertaken for as many times as necessary to assure to the extent possible that all
12 Costs will be covered by remaining Loans expected to have a Positive Recovery.

13 4. Estimate the Disposition Period

14 Once the Adjusted Net Proceeds has been calculated, the Allocation Model then
15 estimates the timing of the various sales of Loans and/or foreclosed properties
16 (“Disposition Period”). The Disposition Period will assist in determining when the Exit
17 Financing and all of the fees payable under the Exit Financing Loan will be repaid. Since
18 the Exit Financing is repaid by using 70% of the proceeds from the sales or recoveries
19 under Loans, the 70% payment, to the extent that it exceeds the Costs allocated to such
20 Loan, becomes a Loan by the members of the Loan LLC which made the Recovery and
21 payment to the other Loans (“Replacement Loan”) which will then bear interest at the
22 same rate as the Exit Financing until finally repaid on or before the Final Settlement date.
23 To the extent that any Permitted Reserve of up to 10% of the gross proceeds from a sale
24 by a Loan LLC is withheld by ML Manager in arriving at Net Disposition Proceeds, or
25 any ML Charges belonging to that Loan LLC that are used for Costs, those amounts must
26 be added on to the amount of the Replacement Loan due to the Loan LLC which bears

1 interest at the same rate as the Exit Financing. The Model estimates the Final Settlement
2 date based upon the projected Disposition Period. Given the difficulty in trying to
3 estimate the Disposition Period and the bankruptcies of borrowers and potential litigation,
4 there are many risks. Accordingly, the Allocation Model is conservative on its estimates
5 of when the properties or Loan Recoveries will occur since any delay in the projected
6 schedule may increase the amount of interest, fees, and Costs incurred.

7 5. Estimate the Expected Costs

8 Based upon the estimate of the Disposition Period, the Allocation Model then
9 estimates all of the Costs which are expected to be incurred through the Final Settlement,
10 including, without limitation, the: (i) the total costs of the Exit Financing, including
11 interest and fees, through payoff of the Exit Financing Loan, (ii) the total cost of the
12 Replacement Loans and Permitted Reserve loans through payoff of such loans on or
13 before the Final Settlement and (iii) all other costs and expenses which are expected to be
14 paid¹⁵ (collectively, the sum of which is called “Expected Costs”).

15 6. Separate Expected Costs into General and Specific Costs

16 The Allocation Model then separates the Expected Costs into those which are
17 general expenses (“General Costs”) to be spread across all Loans and those which should
18 be charged to a specific Loan because they were incurred for the benefit of a specific Loan
19 rather than all Loans generally (“Specific Costs”). ML Manager has the discretion to
20 allocate Servicing Costs as General Costs or Specific Costs based upon the level of
21 servicing needs for a particular Loan.

22 7. Spread the Separated Costs

23 The Allocation Model next spreads the Specific Costs to the Loans for whose
24 benefit the expenses were incurred and the spread the General Costs across all of the
25 Loans. To the extent that the spreading of General Costs and Specific Costs causes a

26 ¹⁵ Future costs have been projected, and these projections have been increased 15%.

1 particular Loan to have a Negative Recovery rather than a Positive Recovery, the
2 Negative Recovery amount of the Uncovered Costs must then be spread to the remaining
3 Loans in the ratio of their Revised Sharing Ratios until all Negative Recovery amounts
4 have been eliminated. This will result in a Total Estimated Costs for each Loan which
5 needs to be maintained. The Total Estimated Costs for each Loan needs to be updated
6 using the procedures set forth in this memorandum as new factual data, in the business
7 judgment of the ML Manager, requires the Total Estimated Costs to be recalculated. Until
8 the Total Estimated Costs for any Loan is fully funded, no distributions should be made to
9 the holders of the Loan, and no Replacement Loan interest shall be accrued. If the Total
10 Estimated Costs is fully funded with respect to a particular Loan but a recalculation with
11 respect to that Loan shows that a higher Total Estimated Costs is required, then the next
12 proceeds payable (i) to the Loan LLC in repayment of any Replacement Loan made by
13 the Loan LLC should be used to fully fund the Loan LLC's share of the Total Estimated
14 Costs before any further funds are distributed to the members of the Loan LLC, and (ii) to
15 the other Investors shall be used to fully fund the other Investors share of the Total
16 Estimated Costs before any further funds are distributed to the other Investors.
17 Conversely, if a recalculation of a Total Estimated Costs shows that such amounts should
18 be lower, then ML Manager, in its business judgment based upon the then current state of
19 facts, may release some or all of the excess as a distribution to the Investors. For all
20 Loans that are able to pay their full share of the General Costs and Uncovered Costs, the
21 percentage of such amount is proportional over all Loans and is just over 3% of the
22 principal balance of the Loan. Moreover, the spreading of the Specific Costs between
23 Loan LLC members and Pass-Through Investors is also proportional, but one loan may
24 have more Specific Costs than another loan.

25 8. Determine Withholding from Distributions

26 Based upon the Total Estimated Costs to be spread or allocated to the ML Loans

1 based upon the Total Estimated Costs for each Loan, the Allocation Model determines for
2 each Loan how much of the Total Estimated Costs the Loan holders are responsible for
3 based on the Revised Sharing Ratio. Next, the Allocation Model determines with respect
4 to the Loan LLCs, whether any Replacement Loan made by the Loan LLC to repay the
5 Exit Financing or other Replacement Loans is greater than the share of the required Total
6 Estimated Costs for which the Loan LLC is responsible. If such Replacement Loan
7 amount is greater than the Loan LLC's share of the Total Estimated Costs then no further
8 withholdings need be made from the Loan LLC's share of any Recovery on the Loan,
9 unless the Total Estimated Costs has been or needs to be increased. If the Replacement
10 Loan made is less than the Loan LLC's share of the Total Estimated Costs or if the Total
11 Estimated Costs has been or needs to be increased, the Model then determines how much
12 must be withheld from the 30% of Net Disposition Proceeds otherwise distributable to the
13 Loan LLC to fund its share of the Total Estimated Costs for that Loan. The Model next
14 determines whether the Adjusted Net Proceeds allocable to the Pass-Through Investors is
15 fully sufficient to fully fund their share of the Total Estimated Costs for the Loan before
16 any distributions are made to Pass-Through Investors in a Loan so as to ensure that all
17 amounts owed by a Pass-Through Investor as its share of the Total Estimated Costs can be
18 paid on or before the Final Settlement.

19 9. Repayment of Replacement Loans and Permitted Reserves prior to
20 Final Settlement

21 Once sufficient Replacement Loans have been made to pay off principal, interest
22 and any other current fees due on the Exit Financing, as subsequent Loans or foreclosed
23 assets are sold, the Allocation Model assumes that 70% of the Net Disposition Proceeds
24 from each additional disposition ("Current Disposition") are available to reduce, but not
25 below the Total Estimated Costs for that Loan, the outstanding balance of the pool of
26 Replacement Loans and Permitted Reserves, including the Replacement Loan being made

1 by the current disposition. The 70% of Net Disposition Proceeds should be paid to all
2 Replacement Loan lenders and Permitted Reserve Lenders, including the Current
3 Disposition Loan lender, in the ratio of the amounts of their then outstanding principal and
4 accrued interest which will partially reduce the outstanding Replacement Loans and
5 Permitted Reserves prior to the Final Settlement date. Amounts repaid to a Replacement
6 Loan lender should first be used to fully fund the then required Total Estimated Costs for
7 its Loan prior to making any distribution to the holders of such Loan.

8 10. Final Settlement and True Up

9 Even though the Total Expected Costs and Adjusted Net Proceeds will be adjusted
10 from time to time as information becomes available when actual Costs and Adjusted Net
11 Proceeds become known by virtue of sales and Costs actually being incurred, on the Final
12 Settlement,¹⁶ the ML Manager shall perform a final true up of revenues and Costs and
13 adjust any final distributions to the holders to make sure to the extent possible that each
14 has paid his or her fair and equitable share of the Costs based upon actual Costs, Adjusted
15 Net Proceeds, and other issues which may arise.

16 **IV. APPLICATION OF THE ALLOCATION MODEL WITH RESPECT TO**
17 **THE NEWMAN LOAN**

18 The Newman Loan reflects a very simple application of the Allocation Model. The
19 Newman Loan was paid in full by the borrower and there was no Loan LLC set up for the
20 loan. This means that there does not need to be an estimate of the loan recovery, or an
21 estimate of the sale date. There were very few loan specific costs with this loan. It was
22 also one of the first loans to be resolved. Because there was no Loan LLC involved, the
23 required 70% payment to the Exit Financier is not applicable. All that is necessary is to

24 ¹⁶ The concept of the Final Settlement includes the receipt of all payments, if any, from
25 the Liquidating Trust or resolution of the Liquidating Trust's share of the Costs. On the
26 other hand, there may be adjustments or true-ups at various times prior to the Final
Settlement as to amounts that are distributed or allocated to the Investors based on further
adjustments in the Allocation Model.

1 calculate the Total Expected Costs, which includes Exit Loan Interest and Costs,¹⁷
2 General Costs and Uncovered Specific Costs and Covered Specific Costs. The Newman
3 Loan, like all other Loans with a Positive Recovery, are expected to pay just over 3% of
4 their principal balance for General and Uncovered Costs. Exhibit C sets forth the Total
5 Expected Costs for the Newman Loan (assuming for now that the 401(k) Plan is excluded
6 from the Allocation Model), and the net distribution to the Newman Loan Investors.

7 Pursuant to the Newman Loan Order, ML Manager has tendered and the
8 undisputed portion of the distribution checks of approximately 80% of the amount of the
9 Newman Loan pay-off to all of the Newman Loan Investors except Rosenfield. When the
10 Allocation Model is approved, the difference between the amount already distributed and
11 the amounts set forth in Exhibit C will be distributed, except for distributions to
12 Rosenfield which will await the resolution of the offset and recoupment issues.

13 As noted in a previous footnote, the Agency Agreements that govern the
14 relationship between ML Manager and the Newman Loan Investors (and all other Pass-
15 Through Investors) provide that the Investors must “indemnify, protect, defend and hold
16 Agent [ML Manager] harmless for, from and against all liabilities incurred by Agent in
17 performing under the terms of this Agreement or otherwise arising, directly or indirectly,
18 from any Loan or the Loan Documents, including all attorneys’ fees, insurance premiums,
19 expenses, costs, damages and expenses.” (Agency Agreement, at ¶ 4(a)). Additionally,
20 the Agency Agreements provide that if an Investor “breaches this [Agency] Agreement by
21 failing to perform or by interfering with the Agent’s ability to perform under this
22 [Agency] Agreement, then [the Investor] shall pay any administrative fees, attorneys’
23 fees, costs, closeout fees and any other fees or charges owed to Agent as compensation
24 hereunder, along with any additional damages incurred by Agent, incidental or

25 ¹⁷ This includes all interest and other costs associated with the Exit Financing such as the
26 \$7.5 million Disposition Incentive Payment, but does not include the principal amount of
the Exit Financing that was spent to pay General Costs.

1 consequential.”

2 In this case, Morley Rosenfield, as Trustee of the Morley Rosenfield, M.D. P.C.
3 Restated Profit Sharing Plan (“Rosenfield”) has repeatedly litigated and contested ML
4 Manager’s actions and authority under the Agency Agreements. Rosenfield is a member
5 of the so-called Rev-Op Group and has been a frequent litigant and objector to ML
6 Manager’s efforts. This litigation and these objections have caused ML Manager to incur
7 substantial fees and costs, have delayed and hindered ML Manager’s ability to resolve or
8 dispose of ML Loan assets thereby increasing interest and other expenses, and otherwise
9 causing damages or costs. ML Manager believes, in the exercise of its business judgment,
10 that the amount of fees, costs and damages owed by Rosenfield, already exceeds or will
11 exceed the amount of their expected distribution from the Newman Loan.¹⁸ ML Manager
12 does not believe that all Investors should bear the fees, costs and damages occasioned by a
13 small group of litigious investors such as Rosenfield and so ML Manager intends to offset
14 or seek recoupment or payment of amounts owing under the Agency Agreements from
15 distributions. Once applied, such offsets will be applied to the appropriate Costs in the
16 Allocation Model and reduce the Total Expected Costs for all loans.

17 Although ML Manager believes that its offset and recoupment claims against
18 certain Investors is supported by the applicable agreements and warranted by the facts,
19 ML Manager also recognizes that there is or may be disputes about these offsets,
20 recoupments or payment claims. To be fair to all parties, including the Investors who are
21 the subject of the offset claims and the Investors who are being damaged by the actions
22 underlying the offset claims, ML Manager has decided that until there is a final resolution

23 _____
24 ¹⁸ For example, this Court granted a Final Declaratory Judgment against Rosenfield and
25 the other Rev-Op Group Investors. Pending before the Court is a fee application where
26 ML Manager is seeking over \$92,000 jointly and severally against the Rev-Op Group,
including Rosenfield. Moreover, there are substantial other fees and costs that ML
Manager has incurred as a result of the Rev-Op Group’s continual objections that are
subject to the indemnity, offset, and recoupment provisions identified above.

1 or agreement on these issues, it will deposit the amounts that are subject to the offset and
2 recoupment claims into an interest bearing escrow with a third party. As such, the
3 distributions for Rosenfield have been deposited into an interest bearing escrow account
4 maintained by the escrow agent, Canyon State Servicing Co. LLC.

5 **V. ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION OF COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED**

6 The Costs that have been incurred and have been accounted for in the Allocation
7 Model must be placed into context of the effort taken, progress and results that have been
8 achieved, and complexities of the issues needing resolution. First, it must be noted that
9 the Administrative Costs incurred during the 11 months of the bankruptcy were several
10 multiples of the costs that have been incurred in the 15 months since confirmation and the
11 number of loans foreclosed on, resolved or otherwise moved forward is many times
12 greater. Indeed, the millstone of the Administrative Costs from the bankruptcy, and the
13 tremendous cost to raise the money to pay those Administrative Costs based on a portfolio
14 of loans, all of which were in default, has created a steep mountain to climb. In addition,
15 as the Court is well aware, there are many different factions or parties involved in this
16 matter and substantial dollars at stake. As such, there have been some significant issues to
17 overcome, agreements to work out and many disputes that have been resolved or are in the
18 course resolution.

19 One of the significant issues that has now been resolved since confirmation is the
20 resolution of all of the professional fee applications from the bankruptcy proceedings.
21 The sheer size of the Administrative Claims that had to be paid in order to emerge from
22 bankruptcy has always been the millstone around the neck of this case. There were two
23 DIP loans owed to Stratera that had to be repaid that totaled, \$5,809,213. In addition,
24 there were substantial professional fees that had to be paid, and some of the operating
25 costs for ML Servicing.

26 In the confirmation process, using the best evidence that was then available based

1 on the Debtor's disclosures and Monthly Operating Statements and the Debtor's then
2 expressed-current estimate of fee exposure, the evidence presented to the Court was that
3 there was approximately \$7 million in outstanding unpaid professional fee claims.
4 Following confirmation, however, over \$13 million in fee applications were filed. This
5 consisted of over 20 separate fee applications. Three small fee applications were litigated,
6 but the rest were resolved through either mediation or negotiation. Through all of this
7 effort, the total amount of fees finally awarded was reduced to about \$9 million.
8 Although there was a significant savings in achieved through this process, it also involved
9 substantial time and effort.

10 In addition to the resolution of the Administrative Claims incurred during the
11 bankruptcy, the administration or disposition of the ML Loan assets is extremely complex,
12 convoluted and time consuming. There were a total of 59 ML Loans. Of this amount,
13 only five were performing. The rest were in default. Prior to confirmation, despite the
14 millions in fees incurred by the Debtor, only few loans were foreclosed on or otherwise
15 resolved. Since confirmation, there have been 26 foreclosure sales. Settlement or
16 resolution has also been reached with several borrowers. One of the most significant
17 settlements was with the Grace Entities. The Grace Entities was one of the primary
18 litigants with the Debtor before and during the bankruptcy, and had asserted one of the
19 largest proofs of claim. After a lengthy settlement and documentation process, a
20 settlement agreement with the Grace Entities was finally approved and has now been
21 consummated. Four of the six properties owned by the Grace Entities has now been
22 foreclosed on and are being marketed for sale. ML Manager expects to file a motion for a
23 sale of the Osborne III property shortly.

24 Another substantial borrower matter has been the Centerpoint project and the
25 Tempe Land Company ("TLC") Loan. As the Court knows, TLC was in its own
26 bankruptcy before Judge Marlar. Following confirmation in this case, the TLC

1 bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7. Through litigation, the stay was lifted and ML
2 Manager conducted a trustee's sale of the property. There are significant collateral issues
3 in that matter such as the ownership of two adjoining lots, and TLC's rights to claims
4 against ML Manager. In addition, Centerpoint Holdings, LLC has recently asserted first
5 right of refusal rights. All of these matters have complicated and delayed matters, but ML
6 Manager has generally prevailed and is now in the process of evaluating offers on the
7 property and will shortly be filing a motion to approve a sale of assets.

8 ML Manager has completed the final sale and disposition of the Chateaux on
9 Central property. In addition, through lengthy and involved negotiations, ML Manager
10 also reached a settlement with all of the mechanic lien holders for less than a third of the
11 gross amount of the liens that had been filed.

12 ML Manager is actively marketing the remaining properties. ML Manager has
13 obtained broker opinions of value on many pieces of property, conducted detailed
14 inspections and analysis of others, and listed the various properties with different brokers
15 for sale.

16 ML Manager has been involved in substantial litigation. It is defending, through
17 title insurance counsel, multi-million dollar mechanic lien claims on five separate
18 projects. Generally, these matters are moving toward resolution but they have, at times,
19 complicated disposition of the properties. ML Manager has continued to defend claims
20 against individual investors that have been brought or threatened by borrowers, including
21 the successful defense in the District Court of an appeal by PDG/Los Arcos arising out of
22 the dismissal of the claims against the Investors by this Court. The borrower has appealed
23 that decision to the Ninth Circuit, where the briefing for that appeal is now proceeding.

24 ML Manager has brought many separate actions against guarantors, and that
25 litigation is pending in many different courts. In addition, ML Manager is litigating with
26 borrowers in at least seven separate borrower bankruptcies.

1 ML Manager has defended claims brought by some investors in state court against
2 other groups of investors, and has assisted in helping other Investors and investor groups
3 in prosecuting claims against various third party defendants. ML Manager negotiated
4 tolling agreements with various third parties to preserve claims that may belong to the MP
5 Funds.

6 ML Manager has spent hundreds of hours in dealing with title insurance issues
7 including the tender of issues related to claims by mechanic lien holders against the
8 various trust properties, trustee sale guarantee reports, insurance following trustee's sales,
9 closing issues related to the disposition of properties and many other matters.

10 ML Manager has also dealt with many Investor Disputes. Of the approximately
11 1800 Investors in Mortgages Ltd., only a few have been active in opposing ML Manager's
12 efforts, however, these few have been very active. These include the eighteen members of
13 the Rev-Op Group, Sternberg, Furst, members of the Oxford Group, and the Guillorys.
14 These Investors generally have fought to reduce their personal exposure to costs and
15 expenses, seeking to shift those costs to other Investors, and/or seek more control or
16 influence over the disposition of the properties at issue. This has resulted in substantial
17 disputes and litigation over various issues such as the agency agreements, the business
18 judgment of ML Manager in its decisions and its general method of operation. These
19 disputes have, at times, substantially hindered and delayed ML Manager's ability to
20 market and dispose of property and attend to the affairs of managing the various loans.
21 ML Manager has incurred significant costs in addressing these disputes and expenses are
22 on-going as there are five pending appeals appealing from nine separate Orders. There
23 has also been disputes with the 401(k) Plan, and other entities.

24 During the time that ML Manager has been attending to all of these issues, it has
25 done so with very little resources. Most of the money from the Exit Financing was used
26 to pay the professional fees and DIP loans incurred during bankruptcy. It has been alleged

1 since before the beginning of the year that ML Manager did not have money to continue.
2 Although finances have been extremely tight, and ML Manager has had to spend
3 considerable time and effort in dealing with the Exit Financing, negotiating various terms
4 and arrangements, and doing everything it can to keep everything afloat, it has been able
5 to do so. This is large part thanks to the literally hundreds of hours that the ML Board
6 members and others have essentially volunteered to accomplish these actions. It is no
7 small feat that ML Manager has moved matters to the current stage and that allocation of
8 money for distributions is even a topic of discussion. Moreover, several of ML Manager's
9 professionals, including Fennemore Craig, have deferred payment of substantial amounts
10 of their fees, interest free, to facilitate the cash flow needs of ML Manager.

11 The bottom line is that ML Manager has moved the administration of the ML
12 Loans forward and final resolution or disposition of the ML Loans and related assets. One
13 step at a time, progress is being made. Although reasonable minds could differ on many if
14 not most of the countless decisions that have been and must be made, there is little serious
15 room for debate as to whether ML Manager has been diligent in efforts and working to
16 make sound decisions using its business judgment.

17 **VI. CONCLUSION**

18 The Court should approve the Allocation Model, determine that it is generally
19 applicable to all Investors, and approve the amount of the net distribution and Total Cost
20 Estimate to the Newman Loan Investors, including the escrowing of the distribution
21 amount for Rosenfield until all offset, recoupment and payment issues are resolved.

22 DATED: September 1, 2010

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25
26

FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

By /s/ Keith L. Hendricks (012750)

Cathy L. Reece

Keith L. Hendricks

Attorneys for ML Manager LLC

1 COPY of the foregoing e-mailed and mailed this
2 1st day of September, 2010 to the following:

3 Tommy D. Crimmins, Trustee
4 or Judith Crimmins, Trustee
5 The Crimmins Family Revocable Trust
6 1021 Sheriff's Posse Tr.
7 Prescott AZ 86303
8 tdcrim@msn.com

9 Robert J. Miller
10 Bryce A. Suzuki
11 Bryan Cave, LLP
12 One Renaissance Square
13 Two North Central Ave., Suite 2200
14 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4406
15 rjmiller@bryancave.com
16 bryce.suzuki@bryancave.com

17 Francis P. Surdakowski & Linda M. Surdakowski, Trustees
18 The Surdakowski Family Trust U/T/A
19 14619 N. 14th Dr.
20 Phoenix AZ 85023
21 azheartdoc1@aol.com

22 /s/ Gidget Kelsey-Bacon

23
24
25
26

EXHIBIT

A

EXHIBIT A

NEWMAN LOAN

LOAN 7987S2 Gross Loan Recovery For Distribution: \$222,236

		Percentage of Loan Amount	Net Distribution at Approx. 80%
1.	Morley Rosenfield, M.D., P.C., Restated Profit Sharing Plan*	50.880%	\$ *
2.	Tommy D. Crimmins or Judith Crimmins Family Revocable Trust	13.965%	\$24,565.09
3.	Francis P. Surdakowski and Linda M. Surdakowski Trust	35.155%	\$61,839.29

** Check for Rosenfield has been placed in escrow pending determination of indemnity claim against the investor and other offsets or recoupments.*

2348215

EXHIBIT

B

EXHIBIT B

SUMMARY NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF DISTRIBUTION ALLOCATION MODEL

- Step 1:** Determine Outstanding Loan Balance on the date of the bankruptcy and Initial Sharing Ratio of the particular loan as compared to the total of all loans on the date of bankruptcy.
- Step 2:** Estimate Gross Loan Recovery for each loan and Adjusted Net Sales Proceeds for estimated selling costs and property liens and to be conservative also adjust for a 20% market uncertainty.
- Step 3:** Recalculate the Sharing Ratio and then adjust to account for any loans with a Negative Recovery.
- Step 4:** Estimate the Disposition Period so all costs required to be paid beginning to end are covered.
- Step 5:** Estimate the Expected Costs to be incurred to the very end plus a 15% cushion for General Costs.
- Step 6:** Separate Expected Costs into General Costs to be spread over all loans and Specific Loan Costs to be paid by only that loan.
- Step 7:** Spread the Separated Costs so that to the extent some costs can't be paid by a loan those Uncovered Costs will be spread across all other loans.
- Step 8:** Determine withholding from Distributions of Total Expected Costs for each loan.
- Step 9:** Repayment of Permitted Reserve & Replacement Loans to be funded as part of Total Expected Costs.
- Step 10:** Final Settlement and True Up - Total Expected Costs and Adjusted Net Proceeds will be adjusted from time to time as information becomes available and once all dispositions and costs are final there will be a Final Settlement and True Up.

EXHIBIT

C

EXHIBIT C

ALLOCATION MODEL APPLIED TO NEWMAN LOAN

Loan No. 7987S2		The Newman Loan		Principal \$222,351												
Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 5		Step 6		Step 7		Step 8	Step 9	Step 10
Determine Outstanding Loan Balance	Determine Initial Sharing Ratio	Gross Loan Recovery	Adjusted Net Sales Proceeds	Revised Sharing Ratio	Disposition Date	Total Expected Costs	Exit Loan Interest & Costs	General Costs	Covered Specific Costs	Net Sales Proceeds Available for Distribution	Net Sales Proceeds Available for Replacement Loan Interest	Replacement Loans Interest Income	Determine Withholding	Future True Up	Projected Payout Based on Model Assumption	
\$222,351	0.0241	\$222,236	\$222,236	0.04122	6/14/2010	\$12,077	\$4,951	\$6,973	\$153	\$210,159	\$0.00	\$17	\$0.00	\$1,642	\$211,784	