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6 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

8 In re
9 MORTGAGES LTD.,
10 Debtor.

Chapter 11
Case No. 2:08-bk-07465-RJH

ML MANAGER’S:

**(1) NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ALLOCATION MODEL,**

And

**(2) MOTION TO APPROVE TREATMENT
OF DISTRIBUTION OF DISPUTED
PROCEEDS**

18
19 Following a hearing on September 21, 2010, this Court issued a minute entry
20 (Docket 2959) “approving the allocation formula proposed by ML Manager in the
21 Allocation Brief filed on September 1, 2010 [Docket No. 2913].” ML Manager has now
22 resolved or liquidated the loans, collateral, or the properties (the “Loans”) associated with
23 six of the loans defined in the Plan of Reorganization as “ML Loans.” These six Loans
24 include (1) Chateaux on Central (*see* Sale Order, Docket No. 2676); (2) the Newman I
25 Loan, (3) the Newman II Loan,¹ (4) Zacher Missouri (*see* Sale Order, Docket No. 2892),

26 ¹ There were no sale orders with the two Newman loans as the borrower paid them in full.

1 (5) City Lofts (*see* Sale Order, Docket No. 2887), and (6) Osborne III (sometimes known
2 as Ten Wine Lofts) (*see* Sale Order, Docket No. 2976). These six Loans generated
3 \$28,683,684.95 in gross proceeds, payments or recovery.² From this, settlement costs
4 were deducted including mechanic liens (that were paid or reserved), property taxes,
5 closing costs, title, escrow broker fess and other property specific expenses. The total
6 amount of settlement costs were \$7,393,841.58. Pursuant to the obligations under the Exit
7 Financing Loan agreement, ML Manager has paid the Exit Lender from these six loans
8 collectively \$8,770,523.50. Where applicable, the “Permitted Reserve” has been taken by
9 ML Manager to pay costs and operations and to create sufficient operating reserves going
10 forward. The total Permitted Reserve was \$2,836,944.90. Finally, pursuant to the
11 Allocation Model approved by the Court, the “Total Estimated Costs” that are not
12 included in the payments to the Exit Lender were \$1,160,931.75. Based on the operation
13 of the Allocation Model approved by the Court, \$8,521,443.22 is available to distribute to
14 investors. This includes \$4,758,799.88 to the so-called “Pass-Through Investors” who
15 did not contribute their interests to a Loan LLCs, and \$3,762,639.58 to the Loan LLCs or
16 MP Funds.³

17 ML Manager hereby provides notice that unless on or before **January 5, 2011** a
18 party with standing files a facially valid objection, or otherwise seeks and obtains an order
19 from this Court to the contrary, ML Manager intends to cause the third-party servicer,
20 Canyon State Servicing Co., L.L.C., to distribute the “undisputed” portion of the
21 distributions set forth above pursuant to the Allocation Model approved by the Court. As
22 demonstrated below, however, there are a few distributions that have been disputed,
23 where a dispute exists as to the right to receive distributions, or claims have been asserted

24 _____
25 ² Attached as Exhibit 1 is a summary of the Proceeds from the Six Loans.

26 ³ No Loan LLCs were established for either of the Newman Loans or for the Chateaux
project. The MP Funds, however, were invested in one of the Newman Loans and in the
Chateaux Project.

1 against an investor who would otherwise receive a distribution (the “Disputed
2 Distributions”). As to these Disputed Distributions, ML Managers requests that the Court
3 approve the recommended treatment set forth herein.

4 **I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

5 This matter arises out of the Mortgages Ltd. bankruptcy that was filed in June,
6 2008. At the time of the bankruptcy, Mortgages Ltd. owned, managed, was the agent for,
7 or otherwise controlled a loan portfolio of approximately \$900 million in loans
8 comprising the aforementioned “ML Loans.” Mortgages Ltd. raised the money to fund
9 this loan portfolio from approximately 1800 investors and other groups. As a result of
10 certain litigation arising during the course of the bankruptcy, the Court held that
11 Mortgages Ltd. had the right to act as the agent for the investors’ interest in the ML
12 Loans. A plan of reorganization was then proposed by the Official Investors Committee
13 that, among other things, created a new entity, ML Manager, to manage and resolve the
14 ML Loans. New entities, known as Loan LLCs, were created for most, but not all of the
15 ML Loans. The ownership interest in the ML Loans held by the MP Funds and any
16 “Pass-Through Investors” who agreed were transferred into the respective Loan LLCs
17 where available. The Loan LLCs are managed by ML Manager and operated pursuant to
18 an operating agreement approved in form during the confirmation of the Plan. Members
19 of the Loan LLCs are entitled to, among other things, vote on “major decisions” affecting
20 their loan. Pass-Through Investors who did not contribute their interests in the ML Loans
21 to the respective Loan LLCs retained their fractional ownership of the ML Loans and, as
22 this Court has determined, are subject to an irrevocable “Agency Agreement” with ML
23 Manager acting as an agent coupled with an interest. Prior litigation has established that
24 ML Manager has the authority to manage and resolve the ML Loans.

25 As part of the confirmation process, the Loan LLCs and ML Manager, among
26 others, entered into a loan agreement with the “Exit Lender” in order to obtain financing

1 to pay the administrative expenses incurred during bankruptcy, and to provide operating
2 capital to implement the Plan. Litigation occurring after the confirmation of the Plan has
3 established that all investors, including the Pass-Through Investors outside of the Loan
4 LLCs, must bear their proportionate share of all costs associated with the Plan in a fair,
5 equitable and non-discriminatory manner, including, among other things, the costs
6 associated with the Exit Loan and the operations of ML Manager. Members of the Loan
7 LLCs have specific obligations with regard to the Exit Loan. For example, until the Exit
8 Loan is repaid, they must pay 70% of their share of the net proceeds recovered from the
9 ML Loans. In addition, ML Manager is authorized to receive a "Permitted Reserve" from
10 the Loan LLCs for operations. The amounts that are held for a Permitted Reserve or paid
11 to the Exit Lender from Loan LLC's share of the that is in excess of their share of the total
12 costs are repaid to the Loan LLCs from other loans with interest at the same rate as was
13 paid to the Exit Lender. Although the Pass-Through Investors do not have the same
14 repayment obligations with the Exit Lender and are not being subjected to the Permitted
15 Reserves, pursuant to the Plan and prior Court Orders they are still required to pay their
16 share of the total costs. The Allocation Model is the means for calculating each investor's
17 share of the costs and expenses.

18 The Allocation Model was approved by the Court after a motion was filed by a
19 Pass-Through Investor, Rosenfield, in what is known as the Newman I Loan. Rosenfield
20 sought an order from the Court requiring ML Manager to distribute the proceeds from this
21 loan. ML Manager did not oppose the distribution of the proceeds, but asserted that it
22 needed to complete the Allocation Model so that the costs could be allocated to
23 Rosenfield and all other investors. Accordingly, the Court established a briefing schedule
24 and forum to approve the Allocation Model.

25 Pursuant to the Court Order, ML Manager filed the Allocation Model on
26 September 1, 2010. Objections to the Allocation Model were required by the Court to be

1 filed by September 10, 2010 and the hearing was held on September 21, 2010. At the
2 hearing, the Court overruled most of the objections and approved the Allocation Model,
3 however, as the Allocation Model is dynamic and intended to adjust and reflect actual
4 figures, the Court allowed the parties who had asserted factual objections regarding the
5 specific distributions under the Allocation Model to have those objections considered
6 when a distribution was proposed. ML Manager informed the Court through its briefing
7 and at the oral argument that it would provide additional information to any party who
8 objected by the deadline, or otherwise requested information through a “Meet and Confer”
9 process.

10 During the process leading up to the September 21, 2010 hearing, ML Manager
11 and its professionals and consultants spent tens of hours with many investors explaining
12 and answering questions with regard to the Allocation Model. Following the hearing and
13 after the six Loans were resolved, ML Manager incorporated the actual numbers from the
14 six Loans described above and made further adjustments and refinements to the schedules
15 that support the Allocation Model. ML Manager then scheduled and participated in a
16 “Meet and Confer” conference on November 5, 2010 with every individual, investor or
17 their counsel that objected to the Allocation Model or otherwise expressed an interest. In
18 addition, ML Manager made its professionals and consultants available to answer
19 questions and to provide back-up or detailed information for the Model. Everyone was
20 informed that if they had objections to the distribution of the six Loans pursuant to the
21 operation of the Allocation Model, they should assert such objections by November, 12,
22 2010. With the exception of the Rev-Op Group, no objections to distribution of the
23 proceeds of the six Loans were made or preserved.

24 It is ML Manager’s understanding and position that only the Rev-Op Group
25 indicated or otherwise preserved objections to Allocation Model. The Rev-Op Group’s
26 only stated or preserved objection was based on the fact that all pre-confirmation expenses

1 were classified in the Allocation Model as general expenses and not allocated to any
2 specific loan. ML Manager does not believe that any other group or entity has preserved
3 or asserted objections to the operation of the Allocation Model with regard to the
4 distributions related to the six Loans.

5 **II. THE ALLOCATION MODEL TREATMENT OF THE PRE-**
6 **CONFIRMATION EXPENSES AS GENERAL COSTS IS NOT A**
7 **VIOLATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE**

8 ML Manager believes that one of the issues that was decided and determined when
9 the Court approved the Allocation Model in its September 21, 2010 minute entry was the
10 standard of review to be employed in evaluating the Allocation Model. ML Manager
11 believes that the Court has confirmed that the “business judgment” rule is the appropriate
12 standard of review.

13 In this case, it is clear that ML Manager exercised careful consideration, examined
14 and considered many options and facts, and did not abuse any discretion in its exercise of
15 its business judgment in treating all pre-confirmation expenses as general costs. There are
16 many different costs and expenses that fall under this category, but most objections,
17 questions or discussions about these costs break down into two categories. Expenses
18 related to Tempe Land Company (the Centerpoint Project), and expenses for other
19 particular loans.

20 **A. The Centerpoint Expenses.**

21 During the course of the bankruptcy, there were certain expenses that were
22 arguably related to the Centerpoint project and the Rev-Op Group apparently objects to
23 their treatment as general costs. Primary among these expenses so challenged is the DIP
24 financing provided by Stratera that was supposed to be utilized to secure the Centerpoint
25 project (the “Stratera DIP”) and costs incurred in the litigation with the Centerpoint
26 developer. There are at least three separate reasons why ML Manager ultimately
determined that these costs should be allocated as general costs.

1 First, this issue was the subject of substantial discussion, negotiation and ultimately
2 agreement prior to the confirmation of the Plan. As such, it was established in the
3 documents associated with the confirmed Plan that the agreed upon treatment would be to
4 treat these costs as general costs. A primary reason for this agreement prior to
5 confirmation was that it was agreed by the parties negotiating the confirmation of the Plan
6 that these costs should ultimately be borne, if possible, by the Liquidating Trust.

7 As the Court will recall, the Plan provided that both ML Manager (which includes
8 the Loan LLCs) and the Liquidating Trust would be responsible for the Exit Loan. ML
9 Manager was to obtain funds from the resolution of the ML Loans and the Liquidating
10 Trust was to seek to obtain funds from the resolution of its assets, which included certain
11 REO (Real Estate Owned, or real property assets that were held in the name of Mortgages
12 Ltd.) and causes of action against third parties. The loan agreement with the Exit Lender
13 requires that the Exit Loan must be repaid from first available funds regardless of whether
14 they come from the ML Loan portfolio, or the Liquidating Trust's assets, however, as
15 between the Liquidating Trust and the Loan LLCs, it was agreed that these costs should be
16 allocated to the Liquidating Trust if and when it obtained enough money to pay them.⁴ In
17 this case, the Allocation Model assumes that all of the Exit Loan and other costs will be
18 paid from proceeds of the ML Loans, however, the Model was designed to accommodate
19 contributions from the Liquidating Trust if and when it recovers sufficient money to make
20 such contributions.

21 Because it was (and still is) contemplated that the Liquidating Trust will be
22 contributing to the ultimate payment of the costs, including the Exit Loan, prior to
23 confirmation there were substantial discussions between the parties involved, which
24 included the Rev-Op Group, as to how to treat such costs. The agreement reached, as
25 reflected in the Interborrower Agreement, was that the Liquidating Trust would pay all of

26 ⁴ A copy of the Interborrower Agreement is attached as Exhibit 2.

1 the general costs attributable to the Debtor. As such, there was significant discussion and
2 ultimately an agreement on what would be considered “general costs” of the Debtor. The
3 agreement reached as reflected in the Interborrower Agreement was that all costs
4 associated with the Stratera DIP, and professional fees⁵ would be allocated to the
5 Liquidating Trust.⁶ In short, the agreement reached prior to confirmation was that the
6 Stratera DIP and professional fees related to the Centerpoint project would be considered
7 general costs and allocated to the Liquidating Trust if and when it obtained money to
8 contribute. In other words, this issue was decided as part of the confirmation process
9 when it was agreed that the costs should be allocated to the Liquidating Trust.

10 Second, the costs involved were the obligations of the Debtor, Mortgages Ltd., and
11 not the investors. As such, they should be treated as general costs. The Stratera DIP has a
12 somewhat convoluted history. Early in the Mortgages Ltd. bankruptcy, the Centerpoint
13 developer was demanding additional advances from the Debtor to allegedly secure the
14 Centerpoint property, had joined in a motion to appoint a trustee, and was threatening to
15 bring claims and lawsuits against all investors. A compromise was reached with the
16 Debtor whereby the Debtor would obtain the Stratera DIP and advance the money to the
17 Centerpoint developer, however, only the Debtor’s assets and not the assets of the
18 investors were pledged or obligated by this agreement. Specifically, the interests of the
19 investors in the Centerpoint loans were not subject to or subordinated by the Stratera DIP.
20 Only the assets of the Debtor and the Centerpoint Developer were obligated to repay the
21 loan. Moreover, it was agreed at the time that this obligation would be a general

22 ⁵ The only exception was that the professional fees incurred to defend investors from
23 claims or lawsuits by various borrowers would be allocated to ML Manager, and not the
24 Liquidating Trust. This means that the fees attributable to Dax Watson’s law firm, Mack,
25 Drucker & Watson were not to be allocated to the Liquidating Trust, but all other pre-
26 confirmation professional fees were.

⁶ See Exhibit 2, definition of “Claims Required to be Paid”, which expressly includes the
Stratera DIP and the Professional Fees, and paragraph 2.2 allocating “Claims Required to
be Paid” to the Liquidating Trust.

1 administrative claim of the Debtor's entire estate, and not the Centerpoint assets.
2 Furthermore, the compromise had impact and importance for all investors because it
3 resolved the threatened litigation against all investors, resolved the pending motion to
4 appoint a trustee, and other estate wide claims. In short, these fees were the Debtor's
5 obligations; not the Centerpoint investor's obligations.

6 Third, Centerpoint was and remains a cornerstone of the estate that substantially
7 impacts all investors. One of the primary reasons that Exit Loan was even available was
8 because of the collateral provided by the Centerpoint project. More than one-quarter of
9 the value of the collateral for the entire Exit Loan was attributed to the Centerpoint project
10 as evidenced by the fact that one-quarter of the title insurance policy obtained by the Exit
11 Lender for its entire loan was attributed to this one project. Moreover, if and when the
12 Centerpoint project is resolved, it will repay a majority of the Exit Loan or a majority of
13 the "replacement loan interest." As such, there is a tangible benefit to all investors.

14 **B. Other Professional Fees.**

15 Another large component of the general costs allocated to every investor is the
16 professional fees incurred prior to confirmation, but paid through the Exit Loan and
17 allocated through the Model. As indicated above, the agreement reached prior to
18 confirmation and documented through the Interborrower Agreement was that the
19 Liquidating Trust would be responsible for all the fees except those incurred in
20 representing individual investors in borrower litigation. As the Court knows from all of
21 the litigation and settlements from the professional fee applications following
22 confirmation, almost all of the professional fees were substantially compromised or
23 reduced. Some compromises or reductions were substantial. Moreover, some were based
24 on arguments that entire categories of work needed to be compromised. Because the
25 reductions were accomplished through settlements that did not allocate specific amounts,
26 it would be arbitrary and subjective to determine how much of the amount that was

1 actually funded by the Exit Loan was for work attributable to a particular loan.

2 Furthermore, most of the issues raised during the bankruptcy had portfolio wide
3 implications even though they were raised in the context of individual loans. For
4 example, the rulings from the litigation on the University & Ash settlement, or the
5 NRDP/Los Arcos litigation against the investors in those loans established precedents that
6 equally impacted all investors. Although the litigation in these instances was brought in
7 the context of a particular loan, they were clearly “test” cases impacting all loans and were
8 litigated as such.

9 In short, it would be arbitrary, subjective, and impractical to allocate the
10 professional fees incurred prior to confirmation to particular loans because, among other
11 reasons, it was agreed prior to confirmation that they would be treated as general costs,
12 there is no definitive basis to determine how much of the work that was actually paid was
13 based on particular loans because all of the payments were compromised, and because
14 much or most of the work had implications beyond the specific loans that were the subject
15 of the pre-confirmation actions.

16 ML Manager considered all of these factors in determining that all pre-
17 confirmation costs should be allocated as a general cost. It considered the fact that
18 (1) these issues had been negotiated and agreed to prior to confirmation, (2) these fees
19 were obligations of Mortgages Ltd, the Debtor, and not any individual investor, (3) that
20 there was common benefit to or at least impact on all investors related to the activities in
21 question, and (4) any allocation would be in large measure arbitrary and subjective based
22 on the compromised nature of the payments and the “test case” implications of the work.
23 For these reasons, it is clear that ML Manager has considered many factors and that its
24 conclusions cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion or unfounded. For this reason,
25 ML Manager’s business judgment should not be overturned.

26

1 **III. DISPUTED DISTRIBUTIONS**

2 Absent objection by January 5, 2011, or a Court Order to the contrary, ML
3 Manager is prepared to disburse the undisputed portion of the proceeds from the six Loans
4 identified above pursuant to the Allocation Model approved by the Court. However, there
5 are a few distributions that have been or may be contested. These Disputed Distributions
6 can be grouped into three categories.

7 **A. Distributions to Investors with Recorded Judgments.**

8 There are two Pass-Through Investors who had recorded judgments against them
9 that were discovered through the process of closing the various sales. These investors are
10 Robert L. Barnes, Jr. (“Barnes”), and the “Barness Investment Limited Partnership, an
11 Arizona Limited Partnership (“Barness”). In each case, to allow the sales to close, the
12 judgment creditors for Barnes and Barness respectively agreed to release their judgment
13 lien as to the real property and to have their lien attach to the net proceeds available to
14 Barnes and Barness respectively.

15 Pursuant to the Allocation Model, Barnes’ share of the net proceeds to be presently
16 distributed from the Zacher-Missouri loan is approximately \$5,000 and his share of the net
17 proceeds to be presently distributed from the Osborne III loan is approximately \$16,000.
18 The total amount of the recorded judgment against Barnes is \$159,512.60 plus accruing
19 interest. The Barnes’ judgment creditor is Kathleen Heth (“Heth”).

20 Pursuant to the Allocation Model, Barness’ share of the net proceeds to be
21 presently distributed from the Osborne III loan is \$112,000. The total amount of the
22 recorded judgment against Barness is \$155,406, plus accruing interest. The judgment
23 creditor is the Town of Gilbert (“Gilbert”).

24 ML Manager proposes that the Court approve and order that the distributions for
25 Barnes and Barness be distributed to their respective judgment creditors.

26

1 **B. Distributions to Investors Who are the Subject of Preference Claims.**

2 The Liquidating Trust has brought preference or other actions (collectively, the
3 “Preference Claims”) against a number of former insiders (the “Insiders”). ML Manager
4 is not a party to the Preference Claims and has not asserted a position with regard to
5 them.⁷ Absent these Preference Claims, ML Manager would distribute the net proceeds
6 (as determined by the application of the Allocation Model) to all investors, including the
7 Insiders, however, because these claims have been asserted, ML Manager seeks direction
8 from the Court as to the treatment for these parties. It may be that the best course of
9 action is for ML Manager to simply escrow any distributions for the Insiders pending
10 resolution of the Preference Claims; however, ML Manager takes no position on this
11 matter. It is ML Manager’s expectation that the interested parties such as the Liquidating
12 Trust and the respective Insiders will present their position to the Court for determination.

13 In addition to the distributions from the six Loans described above, ML Manager
14 continues to hold approximately \$241,099.11 from payments received by the Debtor
15 during the bankruptcy prior to confirmation.⁸ As the Court will recall, during the
16 bankruptcy a motion was filed to allow the distribution of certain payments received by
17 the Debtor. The Court Order (Docket 458) allowed distribution of these payments to
18 investors, but excluded the Insiders. As such, \$241,099.11 probably would have
19 otherwise been distributed to the Insiders, but has been held in an escrow account (the
20 “Insider Escrow”). This Insider Escrow account was transferred to ML Manager after the
21 confirmation. The Insider Escrow consists of payments on the ML Loans. Because they

22 _____
23 ⁷ ML Manager did assert a claim in the probate estate of Scott Coles, and objects to the
24 distribution of any money to Scott Coles’ estate. Notably, in a settlement reached just
25 prior to confirmation, the interest of SM Coles, LLC in any of the ML Loans was
26 transferred to the Debtor, Mortgages Ltd. Under the confirmed Plan, any interest held by
the Debtor was transferred to a Loan LLC, and Radical Bunny was given a corresponding
ownership interest in the Loan LLC for that interest. The treatment of Radical Bunny’s
ownership interest is not considered a “Disputed Distribution.”

⁸ See Exhibit 3 hereto.

1 were payments on the ML Loans after the bankruptcy petition date, which is the date used
2 to establish the principal balance of the loans for purposes of the Plan and the Allocation
3 Model, ML Manager believes that they are subject to the Allocation Model. Accordingly,
4 ML Manager requests that the Court order with regard to the Disputed Distributions
5 provide (1) that the Insider Escrow be subject to the Allocation Model, (2) that for any
6 Insiders (other than Scott Coles' estate or an assignee of Scott Coles⁹) where there is not a
7 dispute as to the distribution, their share of the net amount (after the application of the
8 Allocation Model) be distributed, and (3) if there is a Preference Claim pending that the
9 distribution of money from the Insider Escrow be treated the same as with other
10 distributions to Insiders with pending Preference Claims.

11 **IV. THE CURRENT REV-OP GROUP OFFSET CLAIM**

12 As the Court is aware, there has been substantial litigation between ML Manager
13 and a group of investors known as the Rev-Op Group. ML Manager has incurred
14 substantial fees and costs as a result of this litigation. As of the end of October 2010, ML
15 Manager had quantified the fees, costs and damages incurred as a result of the litigation
16 with the Rev-Op Group at approximately \$336,000.¹⁰

17 The Agency Agreement that this Court has ruled governs the relationship between
18 ML Manager and the Rev-Op Group provides at paragraph 4(a):

19 Participant [Rev-Op Group member in this circumstance]
20 shall indemnify, protect, defend and hold Agent [ML
21 Manager] harmless for, from and against all liabilities
incurred by Agent in performing under the terms of this
Agreement or otherwise arising directly or indirectly, from

22 ⁹ ML Manager has filed a claim in the Coles' probate matter, and does assert an offset or
23 other claim against any distributions that would otherwise go to Scott Coles' estate or an
assignee of Scott Coles.

24 ¹⁰ ML Manager asserts that the Offset Claim is not yet a liquidated amount because the
25 Rev-Op Group continues to engage in litigation and conduct that damages ML Manager
26 and the other investors. However, ML Manager has agreed that as to the distribution from
these six Loans, the amount of the Offset Claim shall be fixed at the pro-rata share of the
\$336,000 that has been incurred, as discussed below. ML Manager reserves the right to
assert additional amounts, once liquidated or established, against future distributions.

1 any Loan or the Loan Documents, including all attorneys'
2 fees, insurance premium, expenses, costs, damages and
expenses.

3 At paragraph 5(d), the Agency Agreement further provides:

4 **Breach.** If Participant breaches this Agreement by failing to
5 perform or by interfering with Agent's ability to perform
under this Agreement, then Participant shall pay Agent,
6 within 30 days of written notice of breach, administrative
fees, attorneys' fees, costs, closeout fees and any other
7 charges owed to Agent as compensation hereunder, along
with any additional damages incurred by Agent, whether
8 actual, incidental or consequential.

9 Essentially, this is a matter of fairness. The Rev-Op Group has caused ML Manager to
10 incur substantial litigation costs, expenses and damages (the "Offset Claim"). ML
11 Manager does not believe that the burden of the Offset Claim should be shifted to the
12 other investors. As such, ML Manager intends to assert the Offset Claim as an offset, set-
13 off and/or recoupment on a pro-rata basis against distributions of first available money to
each of the current members of the Rev-Op Group

14 Initially, the Group consisted of 18 investors; however, Melvin Dunsworth
15 apparently dropped out of the group early in the process and did not contest or oppose the
16 Declaratory Judgment. Recently, ML Manager reached a settlement with four other
17 members of the Rev-Op Group whereby they each agreed to dismiss with prejudice their
18 participation in any further litigation or pending appeals and pay their pro-rata share of the
19 Offset Claim, or approximately \$26,000 that was established as of the date the settlement
20 offer was conveyed. Accordingly, the current Rev-Op Group currently consists of 13
21 members including (1) AJ Chandler 25 Acres, LLC; (2) Bear Tooth Mountain Holding
22 LLP; (3) Cornerstone Realty & Development Inc.; (4) Cornerstone Realty &
23 Development, Inc. Defined Benefit Plan and Trust; (5) Evertson Oil Company, Inc.;
24 (6) The Lonnie Joel Krueger Family Trust; (7) Michael Johnson Investments II, LLC
25 (8) Louis B. Murphey (9) Pueblo Sereno Mobile Home Park LLC (10) Queen Creek
26

1 XVIII, LLC; (11) Morley Rosenfield, M.D. P.C. Restated Profit Sharing Plan; (12) The
2 James C. Schneck Revocable Trust; (13) William L. Hawkins Family LLP.¹¹

3 Without prejudice to the assertion of future amounts against future distributions,
4 ML Manager requests that the Court Order approving the treatment of the Disputed
5 Distributions include a provision authorizing ML Manager to deduct approximately
6 \$310,000 from the distributions of the current Rev-Op Group on a pro-rata basis based on
7 first available cash.¹² Alternatively, ML Manager requests that the Court set an
8 evidentiary hearing on the Offset Claim.

9 **V. CONCLUSION**

10 Notice is hereby given that absent objection and Court Order to the Contrary, ML
11 Manager intends to distribute net proceeds from the six Loans described above pursuant to
12 the Allocation Model approved by the Court. Moreover, ML Manager further requests
13 that the Court issue an Order allowing the distribution of the net proceeds for Barnes and
14 Barnes to their respective judgment creditors, directing the treating of the distributions to
15 Insiders and with regard to the Insider Escrow, and that ML Manager be allowed to deduct
16 on a pro-rata basis from first available cash the Offset Claim from the Current Rev-Op
17 Group.

18 DATED: December 17, 2010

19 FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C.

20
21 By /s/ Keith L. Hendricks (012750)

22 Cathy L. Reece
23 Keith L. Hendricks
24 Attorneys for ML Manager LLC

24 ¹¹ Bill Hawkins is the principal of 8 of these entities including AJ Chandler 25, Bear
25 Tooth Mountain Holding, Cornerstone, Cornerstone Benefit Plan, Pueblo Sereno, Queen
26 Creek XVIII and the Hawkins Family LLP.

¹² Attached as Exhibit 4 is a Spreadsheet showing the allocation of the current Offset
Claim among the Current Rev-Op Group.

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