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8 Sternberg Enterprises Profit Sharing Plan

9 **IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**
10 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

11 In re:
12 MORTGAGES LTD.,

13 Debtor.

In Proceedings Under Chapter 11
Case No. 2:08-bk-07465-RJH

**RESPONSE TO ML MANAGER'S
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS**

Hearing Date: 12/7/09
Hearing Time: 11:00 a.m.

17 This Response is filed by the Rev Op investors who collectively hold
18 approximately \$58.4 million in Rev Op investments (collectively, the “**Rev Op Group**”)
19 and the Sternberg Enterprises Profit Sharing Plan (the “**Sternberg Plan**”), in opposition
20 to the ML Manager LLC’s Motion For Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Re Rev Op Group’s
21 Motion or Clarification And Related Joinders dated November 18, 2009 (the “**Sanctions**
22 **Motion**”). This Response is supported by the declaration of Louis B. Murphey dated
23 October 30, 2009 (the “**Initial Murphey Decl.**”) [DE #2353], and the supplemental
24 declaration of Mr. Murphey attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “**Supp. Murphey Decl.**”).

25 **INTRODUCTION**

26 1. The Sanctions Motion is not so much a motion based on fact and law as it is
27 a rant by the ML Manager and its counsel seeking revenge on the Rev Op Group, the
28 Sternberg Plan, a number of other pass-through investors, and their lawyers, who had the

1 audacity to ask this Court to enter an order clarifying a chapter 11 plan and confirmation
2 order. The Sanctions Motion is devoid of any merit and should be denied by the Court.

3 **FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

4 2. On September 14, 2009, the Rev Op Group filed its clarification motion
5 with respect to the confirmed plan and the confirmation order. [DE #2168] Numerous
6 parties filed joinders. In those pleadings, the Rev Op Group and the joining parties raised
7 a number of issues to be clarified by the Court prior to the fast-approaching deadline that
8 applied to all pass-through investors with respect to the transfer of their interests in notes
9 to the Loan LLCs.

10 3. The ML Manager filed a lengthy objection to the clarification motion. [DE
11 #2265] After a brief non-evidentiary hearing, the Court issued a memorandum decision
12 ruling on a number of those issues. See Memorandum Decision dated October 21, 2009
13 (the “**Memorandum Decision**”).

14 4. Pursuant to the Sanctions Motion, the ML Manager seeks to have the Rev
15 Op Group, the parties who filed joinders, and all of their lawyers sanctioned and held
16 liable to pay the fees incurred by the ML Manager in this contested matter – \$26,758.25.
17 The ML Manager argues that the clarification motion was filed in bad faith and for an
18 improper purpose. The ML Manager contends the clarification motion and joinders “did
19 not present a single debatable issue.” The ML Manager further contends the clarification
20 motion presented procedurally improper objections that the Court held were either not
21 ripe or moot. See Sanctions Motion, p.5, lns. 15-16. The ML Manager’s arguments are
22 refuted by the record before the Court.¹

23 5. Interestingly, the Sanctions Motion does not contain a fact section. The
24 Sanctions Motion contains only argument about what transpired in connection with this

25 _____
26 ¹ The ML Manager also claims the clarification motion raised “untimely plan
27 objections.” Motion, p.5, lns. 13-15. This is factually and legally false. Counsel for the
28 ML Manager surely understands the difference between a plan objection and a motion to
clarify a confirmation order and plan.

1 contested matter. There are several uncontrovertible facts, however, relevant as to why
2 the Court should deny the Sanctions Motion.

3 6. While the Memorandum Decision speaks for itself, the Court *granted* the
4 Rev Op Group’s request for clarification on Issues No. 6, 7, and 8, which addressed the
5 extent of the ML Manager’s authority to make decisions with respect to the notes of non-
6 transferring investors. The Court made it clear the ML Manager’s decision-making
7 authority was and is “to the extent provided by the governing documents . . .”
8 Memorandum Decision, p.2.

9 7. The Court’s ruling on these issues is contrary to the position taken by the
10 ML Manager in this contested matter. The ML Manager argued in its response that it had
11 “sole discretion” to make all decisions on behalf of non-transferring investors. See
12 Response, p.9.

13 8. Immediately after receiving the Memorandum Decision, the ML Manager
14 filed an emergency motion asking the Court to delete the words “sell or” from the
15 Memorandum Decision, so the ML Manager would have the benefit of a court order
16 stating the ML Manager has the right to sell interests of non-transferring investors in
17 notes without their consent.² [DE #2327] The Court made that requested deletion
18 pursuant to its Order dated October 28, 2009. [DE #2338]

19 9. The Rev Op Group challenged this move by the ML Manager through a
20 reconsideration motion. [DE #2352] In ruling on the reconsideration motion, the Court
21 clarified that “deleting the reference to the lack of such authority does not constitute a
22 ruling that the ML Manager has such authority. That issue remains to be decided when it
23

24 ² The ML Manager stated that striking the “sell to” language of the Memorandum
25 Decision “would affirm that ML Manager does not have the right to encumber fractional
26 interests in the loans . . . , but that the ML Manager does have all of the rights set forth in
27 the Agency Agreements, *such as the right to sell the interest in the Loan . . .*” Motion
28 dated October 22, 2009, pp.4-5 (underlines in original; italics and bold face added). [DE
#2327]

1 actually arises and is properly presented to the Court for decision.” See Order dated
2 November 4, 2009.

3 10. Thus, the ML Manager sought and failed to obtain a court order giving it
4 the right to sell interests of non-transferring investors in notes without their consent. This
5 issue remains open to debate, as do essentially all of the other issues regarding the
6 authority of the ML Manager to make such decisions on behalf of non-transferring
7 investors. (Only the ML Manager’s inability to encumber the interests of these parties
8 has been resolved through this contested matter; the ML Manager conceded this issue.)

9 11. The other key, debatable issues that remain relate to the Court’s rulings on
10 the exit financing. Obviously, the Court ruled in favor of the ML Manager on these
11 issues. With due respect to the Court, however, these issues are the subject of an appeal
12 before the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit. Given the fact
13 that: (i) Paragraph U of the confirmation order says what it says; (ii) non-transferring
14 investors are not borrowers on the exit financing; and (iii) the disclosure statement
15 accompanying the plan plainly states the use of the exit financing will not be available to
16 non-transferring investors, there was and is a legitimate debatable issue as to whether the
17 burdens of the exit financing may be imposed on non-transferring investors.

18 12. The Court also needs to consider the path that led to the filing of the
19 clarification motion by the Rev Op Group. The Rev Op Group’s clarification motion was
20 only filed after the ML Manager and its counsel failed to provide “straight answers” to
21 relatively straightforward questions regarding the plan and how it was supposed to work.
22 Initial Murphey Decl., ¶¶3-4.

23 13. Prior to the hearing on the clarification motion, the Rev Op Group, joined
24 by the Lewis Trust and the Underwood Trust, also sought a meeting with the ML
25 Manager and Mr. Kevin O’Halloran, the trustee of the liquidating trust, in an effort to
26 resolve these issues. The meeting occurred October 5, 2009. A couple of issues (e.g., the
27 accounting issue) were resolved at the meeting. Supp. Murphey Decl. ¶¶3-6.

1 14. On the key issues of authority and the imposition of exit financing costs,
2 the Rev Op Group, the Lewis Trust, and the Underwood Trust presented proposals at the
3 meeting in an effort to resolve those issues, or at least create a framework for the
4 resolution of those issues. The ML Manager and the liquidating trustee did not agree
5 with the proposals *and* refused to make any kind of counterproposal. *Id.* at ¶¶10-14.

6 15. Thus, the Rev Op Group was given a choice of capitulating to the ML
7 Manager or going forward with the hearing so clarifications could be provided by the
8 Court. The Rev Op Group chose to go forward with the hearing for obvious, legitimate
9 reasons – to obtain clarifications on these issues before the transfer decision had to be
10 made by pass-through investors.

11 **LEGAL ANALYSIS**

12 16. The ML Manager’s legal analysis is fatally flawed. The ML Manager’s
13 core line of cases are Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1996) and its
14 progeny. The Rainbow decision stands for the basic proposition that, in the right
15 egregious circumstances, a bankruptcy court has the inherent authority under section 105
16 of the Bankruptcy Code to sanction a party who “abused the bankruptcy process in bad
17 faith.” *Id.* at 283-84.

18 17. A cursory review of the Rainbow decision and the other cases cited by the
19 ML Manager makes it obvious they simply do not apply here. An interesting and
20 relevant shortcoming to the Sanctions Motion is the ML Manager’s failure to discuss the
21 facts of *any* of the cases cited therein.

22 18. In Rainbow, the trial court ruled that the sanctioned party signed a false
23 statement of financial affairs in violation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 – i.e., he was hiding
24 assets. He also filed a bankruptcy petition in bad faith in what the trial court found to be
25 an elaborate scheme to divert \$180,000 contrary to the instructions of a chapter 7 trustee.
26 The trial court found this conduct to be a “classic case of ‘apartment house hijacking.’”
27 *Id.* at 280.

1 19. On appeal, the sanctioned party did not dispute the facts established by the
2 trial court. Id. at 279. Instead, he argued the trial court had no authority to sanction him
3 \$250,000 under the court’s inherent powers. Id. at 283. Here, the facts are totally
4 different than the egregious situation in the Rainbow decision.

5 20. The ML Manager argues that Silberkraus, 253 B.R. 890 (Bankr. C.D.
6 2000), supports its position. Silberkraus was a bad faith filing where the individual
7 debtor filed chapter 11, fought stay relief and other actions of its key creditors, and then
8 seven months after the filing conceded he had no ability to reorganize without the consent
9 of these creditors. Id. at 894-901.

10 21. In summary, Rainbow, Silberkraus, and the other cases cited by the ML
11 Manager have literally no factual similarities, and are legally inapplicable, to the instant
12 case. Moreover, the ML Manager has not cited a single case where a party seeking
13 clarification of a plan or confirmation order was sanctioned by a court. The ML Manager
14 simply has no facts or case law to back up its flawed argument for sanctions.

15 22. The ML Manager also argues that the Rev Op Group’s clarification motion
16 was filed for an improper purpose – allegedly trying to alter or modify the plan --
17 “outside any statutory framework allowing for such change.” This is false. The Rev Op
18 Group’s motion sought *clarification* of the plan and confirmation order. In support of
19 this request, the Rev Op Group cited to a line of cases, including Ninth Circuit authority,
20 that the Court retains the jurisdiction and has the authority to interpret its own orders,
21 including the confirmation order.³

22 23. The ML Manager makes two additional arguments the Court should
23 discard. The ML Manager contends that Bankruptcy Rule 9011 somehow supports its
24 position. See Sanctions Motion, p.3. Even assuming Rule 9011 provided some basis for
25

26 ³ The clarification motion cited to the following cases: In re Taylor, 884 F.2d 478
27 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Franklin, 802 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1986); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
28 Mesa Air Group, Inc., 355 B.R. 214, 218 (D. Hawaii 2006) (citing In re Petrie Retail,
Inc., 304 F.3d 223, 230 (2d Cir. 2002)).

1 relief by the ML Manager, which it does not for the very same reasons the Rainbow
2 argument must fail, the ML Manager never complied with the procedures mandated by
3 Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Thus, the ML Manager's argument under Bankruptcy Rule 9011
4 must fail.

5 24. Finally, the ML Manager adds a paragraph in its Sanctions Motion arguing
6 that courts have considered a confirmed plan to be a contract, so it is entitled to an
7 attorneys' fee award as a matter of contract law and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Importantly, the
8 ML Manager (once again) fails to cite a single case where a fee award was granted under
9 that legal theory.

10 **CONCLUSION**

11 The Rev Op Group filed the clarification motion for the reasons set forth therein,
12 and those reasons were and are legitimate. The same is true for the Sternberg Plan and its
13 joinder. These parties wanted this Court's unbiased views on the issues presented in the
14 context of deciding whether or not to transfer their interests into the applicable Loan
15 LLCs formed under the plan. The Court's rulings thereon provided the Rev Op Group –
16 and all pass-through investors – with information important to their transfer decision.
17 The ML Manager's frustration with the fact a group of investors sought and obtained
18 these clarifications provides no basis for relief for the ML Manager. Thus, the Sanctions
19 Motion should be denied by the Court.

20 DATED this 30th day of November, 2009.

21 BRYAN CAVE LLP

22 By /s/ RJM, #013334

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28 the Sternberg Enterprises Profit
Sharing Plan

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COPY of the foregoing served this
30th day of November, 2009:

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/s/ Sally Erwin

EXHIBIT “A”

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14 MORTGAGES LTD.,
15 Debtor.

16 In Proceedings Under Chapter 11
17 Case No. 2:08-bk-07465-RJH

18 **SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION**
19 **OF LOUIS B. MURPHEY**

20 I, Louis B. Murphey, declare as follows:

21 1. I am an adult person over the age of twenty-one (21). I am a resident of
22 Saint David, Arizona, and I have personal knowledge of the facts recited herein.

23 2. I am one of several individuals and entities represented by Bryan Cave
24 LLP, which group is generally referred to as the "Rev Op Group." I personally invested
25 \$6.0 million in Mortgages Ltd.

26 3. The Rev Op Group filed its clarification motion on September 14, 2009.
27 Thereafter, the Rev Op Group, the Lewis Trust, and the Underwood Trust tried to set up a
28 meeting with the ML Manager and the trustee of the liquidating trust, Mr. Kevin
O'Halloran, in an effort to resolve or narrow the issues raised in the clarification motion.
We met on October 5, 2009.

4. At the meeting, the Rev Op Group was represented by Bill Hawkins and
me; Bob Miller attended as our legal counsel. We were joined by Cary Forrester, who
attended as counsel on behalf of the Lewis Trust and the Underwood Trust. Mark

1 Winkleman attended as business representative of the ML Manager; Cathy Reece
2 attended as its counsel. Mr. O'Halloran also was in attendance, represented by Scott
3 Jenkins.

4 5. The October 5 meeting was lengthy. At the request of Ms. Reece, we came
5 to the meeting prepared to discuss every issue raised in the clarification motion, along
6 with proposed solutions to these issues.

7 6. Two of the issues were quickly resolved. The ML Manager's
8 representatives acknowledged that the ML Manager had no authority to encumber any of
9 the Rev Op investors' interests in the notes and deeds of trust. The ML Manager's
10 representatives also agreed to provide investors with a commercially reasonable
11 accounting.

12 7. The last business day prior to this meeting (October 2, 2009), the ML
13 Manager had filed its response to the clarification motion, so we knew the ML Manager's
14 position on most of the issues raised in the clarification motion. The ML Manager's
15 response resolved, in part, a couple of additional issues.

16 8. Specifically, the ML Manager attached a copy of its assignment document
17 to the response. Thus, we generally knew the ML Manager's position with respect to the
18 first two issues raised in the clarification motion: (i) the status of the various agreements
19 as they related to the Rev Op Group; and (ii) how the ML Manager came to hold any
20 contractual rights it contended were binding on members of the Rev Op Group.

21 9. What remained unresolved then as a factual matter is when the ML
22 Manager intended to give copies of these contracts to the Rev Op Group members. Ms.
23 Reece told us that we would be given copies of the relevant contracts the following week.
24 As discussed in my declaration dated October 29, 2009, those contracts were actually
25 delivered on October 26 – a week after the Court issued its initial memorandum decision
26 on the clarification motion.

1 10. Most of the meeting time on October 5 was devoted to discussing the exit
2 financing and authority issues. Again, at the request of the ML Manager, we came to the
3 meeting with proposals on how to address these issues.

4 11. As to the issue of how authority issues could be addressed on a going
5 forward basis, we proposed that the ML Manager consider implementing a “major
6 decision” approval process much like the existing process provided for in the plan, so that
7 the non-transferring investors’ input would be solicited and counted like the members of
8 the Loan LLCs.

9 12. As to the issue of exit financing and the allocation of those costs, we told
10 them that a key problem from our perspective was that, to the best of our knowledge,
11 nobody had actual factual analysis available on the current cost of the exit financing and
12 how the ML Manager proposed to allocate it among the Loan LLCs and the non-
13 transferring investors. The Rev Op Group certainly had no access to the specific debt
14 numbers and how the ML Manager proposed to allocate this debt across the various
15 parties.

16 13. Thus, we asked the ML Manager to work with Ed McDonough to prepare
17 an analysis of how the existing balance of the exit financing was proposed to be allocated
18 across the loan portfolio. Our goal was that, by getting real numbers on the table rather
19 than concepts, we could begin the process of actually trying to sort out who owed what
20 and how it would get paid.¹ Neither the ML Manager’s representatives nor the
21


22 ¹ This concept applied retroactively and prospectively. From the perspective of the
23 Rev Op Group as a whole and from my personal perspective, we knew we would have to
24 bear an appropriate burden of the costs associated with Mortgages Ltd.’s “exit” from
25 chapter 11, although it needed to be subject to the other constraints of the plan as
26 confirmed by the Court -- e.g., Paragraph U of the confirmation order. On a going
27 forward basis, we also expected to be assessed for appropriate charges, rather than having
28 the ML Manager borrow amounts to pay these charges which would only create
additional needless expense (e.g., interest expense owed to the exit financier). We simply
wanted to start the process of resolving these issues by having the ML Manager tell us
how much they thought everyone would have to pay to date.

1 liquidating trustee agreed to provide this information. They refused to support this
2 approach.

3 14. After much discussion, no real progress was made on these two crucial
4 issues. We closed the meeting by asking the ML Manager and the liquidating trustee to
5 make some sort of alternative proposal, so that the Rev Op Group and Mr. Forrester's
6 clients could consider what they proposed as alternative solutions. They refused to make
7 any kind of alternative proposal, so the meeting ended.

8 I declare under penalty of perjury the foregoing is true and correct to the best of
9 my knowledge, information and belief.

10 DATED this 30th day of November, 2009.

11 
12 _____
13 Louis B. Murphey